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The comparative assessment of physician performance, also known as ‘physician 
profiling’ is frequently used by healthcare funders. It aims to identify and improve 
the resource efficiency and quality of physician care. South African private 
healthcare funders use a wide range of profiling techniques; however, currently 
the use of frontier analysis is absent. This study explores the use of the non-
parametric frontier analysis technique called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
for the profiling of physicians in South Africa. This is investigated by following a 
DEA profiling approach to evaluate the performance of 403 general/ paediatric 
surgeons in providing in-hospital services in 2012. A 7-input 1-output VRS DEA 
model is used to determine the efficiency of the surgeons. The profiling results are 
then analysed to determine their usefulness. It results reveal that 58 surgeons are 
efficient, representing only 14.4% of surgeons profiled. Therefore, the DEA 
approach reveals a large potential for efficiency improvements. The average 
efficiency score of inefficient surgeons is found to be 0.68. This means that, on 
average, inefficient surgeons have to decrease resource utilisation by 32% to 
achieve efficiency. The DEA approach is also found to be proficient at identifying 
the physicians presenting the most severe levels of inefficiency. 37 surgeons are 
found to be significantly inefficient. The approach also allows for the 
identification of peers against which inefficient surgeons are able to directly 
compare their practices. These results are determined to be of significant potential 
use to South African private healthcare funders. It is, however, noted that the 
analysis and results obtained was solely of a statistical nature. Closer 
consideration of the clinical appropriateness of the results is essential. In any case, 
this study concludes that a DEA profiling approach can be considered a useful 
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The cost of healthcare services worldwide has experienced rapid growth over the 
past decade and this trend is expected to continue (Deloitte, 2013). This issue is of 
major concern in South Africa where healthcare in the private sector is only 
affordable to a minority of the population (McLeod & Grobler, 2010; Mills et al., 
2012; van den Heever, 2012). Escalating healthcare service prices result in 
increased expenditure faced by medical schemes1 in order to provide indemnity 
cover for their beneficiaries’ healthcare needs. The increasing healthcare service 
costs in South Africa represent one of the major forces resulting in annual medical 
scheme contribution rate increases exceeding CPI-inflation by at least 4% for each 
of the 12 years preceding 2013 (du Preez, 2013; McIntyre, 2010; Ramjee, 
Kooverjee, & Dreyer, 2013).  
In an attempt to curb the rising cost of healthcare, medical schemes have 
prioritised what has come to be known as ‘managed care’. Managed healthcare in 
is defined in South African regulation as “an arrangement through which 
utilisation of healthcare is monitored though the use of mechanisms which are 
designed to monitor appropriateness, promote efficacy, quality and cost 
effectiveness of delivery of relevant health services” (Medical Schemes Act No. 
131 of 1998).  Managed care, therefore, comprises the entire range of cost-saving 
and quality-enhancement techniques in healthcare delivery (Edmunds, 1997).  
The focus of this study is the managed-care technique called ‘physician profiling’. 
Lasker, Shapiro, and Tucker (1992) describe physician profiling as the use of 
                                                          
1 Medical schemes are non-for-profit entities that play the dominant private healthcare-
funding role in South Africa. Regulation limits the financing of comprehensive health 
insurance to medical schemes. They are distinct from South African health insurance 
companies as they are regulated separately based on social-solidarity principles (McLeod, 
2005). A detailed description of medical schemes and the role they play in the South 
African healthcare environment is provided in Section 2.1.1. 
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epidemiological methods to compare practice patterns of physicians2 on the basis 
of cost, service use, or quality of care. Lasker et al. (1992, p. 288) elaborate that 
physician profiling is used to “identify overutilisation of services, to uncover 
problems with the efficiency and quality of care, and thereby assess physician 
performance”. Expenditure on physician healthcare services in South Africa 
comprised more than 30% of total private healthcare expenditure in 2012 (Council 
for Medical Schemes, 2013). This percentage rises substantially if one includes all 
related healthcare services that physicians utilise in the treatment of their patients 
(Hodge, Fiandeiro, Lynch, & Mohamed, 2012). The significant proportion of 
healthcare services for which physicians are responsible makes monitoring 
physician efficiency essential in order to curb rising healthcare costs. Profiling is a 
method of achieving this through the evaluation of physician performance as well 
as providing physicians with education and incentives aimed at increasing their 
level of efficiency (Garnick et al., 1994). Physician profiling therefore takes into 
consideration the full range of managed-care mechanisms listed above. 
Over the past 25 years, frontier analysis techniques have increasingly been 
employed by international healthcare funders to evaluate the performance of 
physicians (Hollingsworth, 2008). While medical schemes do extensively employ 
physician profiling, the use of frontier analysis techniques is absent. The purpose 
of this study is to investigate the use of the non-parametric frontier analysis 
technique known as ‘Data Envelopment Analysis’ (DEA) for profiling 
applications in South Africa. This is explored using a DEA approach to profile the 
efficiency of 403 general/ paediatric surgeons when providing in-hospital services 
in the private sector. The results obtained are then analysed to determine what 
profiling using DEA may reveal about the efficiency of these surgeons as well as 
what efficiency improvement interventions these results may be able to inform. It 
                                                          
2 Throughout, the term ‘physician’ refers to a professional who practices medicine, and 
who is involved in promoting, maintaining or restoring human health through the study, 




is important to note that this study is limited to the assessment of DEA as a 
profiling methodology. Profiling outcomes obtained from the DEA approach are 
not directly compared with other profiling techniques; frontier analysis or 
otherwise. The next section provides a description of the South African healthcare 
industry in order to provide insight into the environment in which physician 
profiling is performed. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of physician 
profiling in order to ensure understanding of the problem being addressed and the 
role profiling plays in its solution. Section 4 & 5 discuss the nature of efficiency 
and the use of DEA in order to evaluate performance. Section 6 outlines in detail 
the physician profiling methodology undertaken and Section 7 describes the 
principal results obtained from the profiling process. Finally, Section 8 concludes 
this study with a discussion on what has been revealed by the investigation of 




2 South African healthcare environment 
The South African healthcare environment is composed of both private and public 
healthcare sectors, catering to different segments of the population (McLeod, 
2005). The private and public sectors are differentiated according to the manner in 
which healthcare services are both funded and provided (Hodge et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, South Africa operates a dual healthcare system with regard to both 
the funding and provision of healthcare. ‘Private healthcare’ refers to healthcare 
services that are both privately funded by the patient and accessed through private 
for-profit service providers (Hodge et al., 2012). Conversely, ‘public healthcare’ 
is funded by the government through tax contributions and accessed through 
public healthcare facilities staffed and run by government employees (McLeod, 
2005).   
While the above describes the current state of the South African healthcare 
environment, significant healthcare policy reforms are planned. These involve a 
transition to a National Health Insurance (NHI) environment. The current funding 
and provision systems are, therefore, expected to change markedly. The details of 
NHI are, however, still in their early stages (Matsoso & Fryatt, 2013). Physician 
profiling in this study is performed with consideration of the current state of the 
South African healthcare environment. Future consideration of the profiling 
process undertaken and the results obtained must reflect any changes that have 
occurred. 
2.1 Private healthcare funding 
Private healthcare funding in South Africa comprises purchasing health insurance 





2.1.1 Medical schemes 
Healthcare financing regulations in South Africa require that indemnity health 
insurance take the form of ‘medical schemes’, which are distinguished from 
conventional health insurers in a number of ways (Medical Schemes Act No. 131 
of 1998). Medical schemes are not-for-profit entities owned by their members 
(McLeod & Grobler, 2010; McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Furthermore, they are 
regulated according to three core social-solidarity principles, namely: ‘open 
enrolment’, ‘community-rating’, and all medical scheme products must provide 
cover for a package of ‘prescribed minimum benefits’ (PMBs) (McLeod, 2005).  
Open enrolment requires that all schemes accept anyone who wants to become a 
member, provided they are able to afford the monthly contributions (McLeod, 
2005). The only exception is ‘restricted membership’ schemes that limit 
membership of individuals based on their particular employer or industry 
(McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Community rating requires that all medical schemes 
charge their members the same standard contribution rate, regardless of age, 
gender and/or health status (past and present) (van den Heever, 2012). Therefore, 
medical schemes are prohibited from underwriting and setting contribution rates 
according to the risk of the individual member (McLeod, 2005). Schemes may, 
however, impose waiting periods and age-related late-joiner penalties, as defined 
in regulation, in order to mitigate anti-selection and moral hazard. Every product 
offered by a medical scheme must provide cover for a defined minimum package 
of benefits (McLeod, Mubangizi, Rothberg, & Fish, 2003). These PMBs comprise 
272 diagnosis-treatment pairs, 26 chronic diseases and all emergency care; the 
reimbursement of which must be covered in full by the scheme, without financial 
limits or co-payments (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007; Taylor, Taylor, Burns, Rust, & 
Grobler, 2007). There were 90 medical schemes providing near-indemnity cover 
to 8.8 million individuals in 2012 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2013). Medical 
schemes are the primary private healthcare funders in South Africa covering 
16.6% of the population (Council for Medical Schemes, 2014).  
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Medical schemes are required to perform certain administrative functions. “Some 
schemes elect to perform the administration tasks themselves (‘self-administered’ 
schemes), whilst others contract with a third-party administrator undertaking the 
administration role on behalf of the scheme” (Hodge et al., 2012, p. 18). Third-
party administrators may provide their services to multiple schemes. Furthermore, 
unlike medical schemes, they are for-profit entities remunerated by schemes on an 
agreed-upon basis (Hodge et al., 2012; van den Heever, 2012). Examples of 
services performed by the administrator on behalf of the scheme include: 
collecting and reconciling contributions, validation and payment of all claims, 
financial reporting, information management and data control as well as customer 
services and acquisitions (Council for Medical Schemes, 2010).  
As stated in Section 1, the term ‘managed care’ in South Africa encompasses all 
techniques designed to promote the efficient provision of high-quality care, 
including physician profiling (Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998). Examples 
of managed care techniques utilised in medical schemes (apart from physician 
profiling) include: selective contracting, pre-authorisation, and capitation as well 
as case-, disease-, and chronic medication management (National Library of 
Medicine, 2014). Managed-care techniques are of particular importance in South 
Africa since medical schemes are subject to community rating and open 
enrolment. Medical schemes, therefore, have very limited ability to control 
contribution rates using underwriting and risk rating. As a result, they are heavily 
dependent on managed-care techniques to control healthcare costs (McLeod, 
2005). 
Managed care services in South Africa are primarily provided by managed care 
operators (MCOs) as well as the medical scheme administrators themselves (van 
den Heever, 2012). MCOs are also for-profit entities but the services that they 
provide to medical schemes are limited to managed-care functions. In addition, 
the medical scheme may itself perform some of the managed care functions and 
outsource the more specialised functions to a MCO or administrator (Hodge et al., 
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2012). There were 27 administrators and 41 MCOs accredited to provide services 
to medical schemes in 2012 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2013; Econex, 2013).  
2.1.2 Other forms of healthcare funding 
There has been growth in other healthcare financing products provided by 
conventional for-profit insurers in South Africa. Such products include hospital 
cash plans, critical illness cover, disability cover and gap cover (Econex, 2013). 
However, healthcare funding by conventional health insurers is still limited to 
providing cover to a very small percentage of the population (Econex, 2013).  
There is also a significant amount of self-funding by individuals in South Africa 
(McLeod & Grobler, 2010). Self-funding involves the financing of private 
healthcare services through out-of-pocket payments made directly to the private 
provider (van den Heever, 2012). Self-funding is required when individuals do not 
have any (or sufficient) healthcare insurance but still access private healthcare 
services (Hodge et al., 2012). The combination of insurance- and self-funding 
results in approximately 35% of the population being served to some degree by 
the private sector (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2011; Hodge et al., 
2012).   
The remainder of the South African population rely solely on public sector for the 
provision and funding of their healthcare needs. Healthcare in the public sector is 
provided for free to those individuals earning below the means test of R6 000 per 
month (Reference). Individuals earning salaries higher than this are required to 
make payments out-of-pocket for their public healthcare needs. These payments 
are based on the Uniform Patient Fee Schedule (UPFS) (Western Cape 
Government Hospital Tariffs, 2014).  
It is important to reiterate at this point, however, that this study investigates the 
use of DEA as a profiling methodology in the South African private sector. The 
funding mechanism of focus, therefore, is through medical schemes. 
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2.2 Private healthcare provision 
Private healthcare provision in South Africa refers to medical professionals 
treating patients utilising a wide range of services provided in privately-owned 
healthcare facilities (Hodge et al., 2012).  The main types of private healthcare 
service provider are: primary-care providers, specialists, and private hospitals 
(Hodge et al., 2012; McLeod, 2005; van den Heever, 2012). 
Primary-care providers include general practitioners (GPs), dentists and 
pharmacies (van den Heever, 2012). These providers are often the patient’s first 
contact with the health system and they assume responsibility for the provision of 
continual and comprehensive medical care to individuals, families, and 
communities (Hodge et al., 2012; WHO, 2010). Services provided by primary-
care providers include diagnosis and performing medical procedures as well as 
referrals for hospital-based treatment and for further examination by specialists 
(van den Heever, 2012). 
Specialists provide many of the same services as primary care providers, however, 
they focus their practices on certain disease categories, types of patients, or 
methods of treatment (Hodge et al., 2012; WHO, 2010). In order to become a 
specialist, doctors further their medical education in a specific field of medicine. 
Examples of specialists are oncologists, surgeons and psychiatrists. 
Private hospitals are medical facilities that provide medical, surgical and 
psychiatric care as well as treatment of the sick or injured (Hodge et al., 2012). 
Hospitals provide patients with a bundle of discipline-related specialist services 
(surgery, oncology, paediatrics etc.), and general-support services (nursing, 
recovery, radiology, pathology etc.) (Competition Commission, 2013; van den 
Heever, 2012). However, the mix and/or quality of services provided may vary 
substantially between hospitals (Hodge et al., 2012). 
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According to South African regulation, private hospitals may not employ 
physicians; neither primary-care providers nor specialists (Hodge et al., 2012; van 
den Heever, 2012). Private hospitals are thus limited to providing physicians with 
(1) the facility in which their patients are treated and subsequently recover 
(consultation rooms, operating theatres, various types of wards etc.), and (2) the 
supporting resources needed to effectively treat patients (Hodge et al., 2012). 
These supporting resources include: medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, surgical 
items, nursing services and ‘hotel services’ such as beds, catering and associated 
administration services (Hodge et al., 2012). An important consequence of 
hospitals not employing physicians is that hospital managers are predominantly 
concerned by the quality of physician care and are largely indifferent to physician 
resource efficiency (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). As a result, the profiling of 
resource efficiency in South Africa falls squarely on funders and/or third-party 
managed care providers. 
These healthcare service providers are thus separate entities and are reimbursed 
by the medical scheme and/or the patient; depending on the nature of private 
healthcare funding (McLeod & Grobler, 2010). Nevertheless, they are required to 
work effectively together in order to provide integrated healthcare solutions to 




3 Physician profiling3 
3.1 Definition, objectives, applications and outcomes 
Physician profiling is a managed care technique, which uses epidemiological 
methods in order to compare the practice patterns of physicians according to cost, 
resource utilisation and quality of care (Garnick et al., 1994; Lasker et al., 1992; 
Shapiro et al., 1993). From a funder perspective, profiling is the comparative 
performance assessment of the physicians providing healthcare services to their 
beneficiaries; both GPs and specialists (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 2013; 
Hollingsworth, 2008). The funder’s objective is to evaluate physicians’ relative 
ability to provide resource efficient treatment to patients while still maintaining 
the highest achievable levels of quality.  
While the above definition represents the overarching objectives of physician 
profiling, particular methods may focus individually on resource utilisation, cost 
effectiveness or quality of care. Physician profiling has become common practice 
by funders in various healthcare industries around the world especially for use in 
incentive-based remuneration of physician practices (Garnick et al., 1994). 
Rosenthal, Landon, Normand, Frank, and Epstein (2006) state that more than half 
of the 242 health maintenance organisations (HMOs) that they surveyed in the 
United States were engaging in some form of physician profiling. 
A key methodological feature needs to be noted regarding the choice of norm 
against which physicians are compared. Comparison is made either by relating a 
particular physician’s practice pattern to a norm determined by other similar 
physicians (“practice-based norm”) or by relating a physician’s outcome to an 
                                                          
3 This section is largely based on the work done by Lasker et al. (1992) and Shapiro, 
Lasker, Bindman, and Lee (1993) concerning issues of attempting to achieve the full 





accepted practice guideline (“standards-based norm”) (Lasker et al., 1992, p. 288; 
Normand, Glickman, & Gatsonis, 1997). An advantage of practice-based norms is 
that physicians may be more inclined to cooperate with efficiency improvement 
interventions if profiles are based on the efficiency levels of their peers; as 
opposed to some empirically determined practice guideline. If, however, the 
determined practice-based norm is based upon comparison with inefficient 
physicians then it will not reflect the optimal level of efficiency that can be 
achieved (Garnick et al., 1994). The standards-based norm can avoid this issue if 
appropriate practice guidelines can be determined upon which to base the norm 
(Shapiro et al., 1993). This is, however, a very complicated task and may lead to 
physicians contesting the level and construction of the standard practice pattern 
upon which the standard-based norm is determined. 
Lasker et al. (1992) state three main applications of physician profiling, namely: 
quality improvement, utilisation review and the assessment of physician 
performance. Physician profiling can be used in a number of ways to improve the 
quality of healthcare. Many medical conditions and procedures exhibit large 
variations in patient outcomes. Profiling can be used to analyse whether certain 
physicians are achieving higher rates of negative outcomes than others (Garnick et 
al., 1994). Furthermore, profiling is able to inform whether these negative 
outcomes are the result of external factors, such as differences in case-mix, or due 
to poor quality of care by certain physicians (Findlay, 1993; Garnick et al., 1994). 
Funders can then distribute the results of the profiling process to physicians in 
order to provide them with detail on the parties and other elements impacting the 
quality of services they provide. Physicians are thereby provided with information 
allowing them to identify how and by whom quality may be improved (Shapiro et 
al., 1993).  
Profiling also allows for the analysis of the utilisation rate of healthcare resources 
used by physicians; known as ‘utilisation review’. This is achieved by identifying 
outlier physicians among those profiled who have used significantly more 
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resources to treat their patients than the norm (Lasker et al., 1992). The focus 
solely on outlier physicians has the benefit over alternative methods of utilisation 
review since it exempts most of the physicians from detailed case-by-case review 
of their practices (Findlay, 1993). In addition, funders can provide the outlier 
physicians with standard- and/or practice-based norms, providing them with 
information on how to achieve greater resource utilisation efficiency. 
Potentially the most versatile use of physician profiling is in the assessment of 
physician performance. The assessment of physician performance is often based 
on a combination of the above quality and resource utilisation analyses. Lasker et 
al. (1992) provide the following potential applications for physician performance 
assessment. First, physician assessments can form the basis for the accreditation 
of physicians as well as advising necessary levels of continued education. Second, 
physician assessments can routinely be performed to monitor continued 
compliance with standard practice guidelines or quality improvement measures. 
Third, performance assessments can be used to provide funders with evidence on 
the efficiency of physicians that will be prescribed to their members. In particular, 
the assessment of physicians based on cost-efficient performance has become 
common practice in the United States and often forms the basis of incentive-based 
remuneration of physicians (Charvet, 2009). As mentioned above, assessment of 
provider performance and remuneration is achieved by comparing provider’s 
performance to some norm; either standards- or practice-based. 
Parente (2002) summarises the various outcomes produced by a physician 
profiling process allowing funders to achieve the objectives stated above. Profiles 
help funders to monitor the performance of physicians in order to ensure that they 
are maintaining expected levels of resource utilisation and quality of care. Funders 
are able to present patients with feedback on the level of efficiency and quality of 
care with which they are being treated. This allows patients to make informed 
decisions when choosing a particular physician. Funders are also able to provide 
physicians with detailed results of the profiling process, which can be used to 
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provide them with focused education of how to improve their resource efficiency 
and quality of care. This feedback can be used to convey financial incentives to 
physicians for achieving the required levels of efficiency as well as providing 
justification for punitive action against physicians who do not achieve the 
required efficiency standards (Garnick et al., 1994). An example of such punitive 
action may be the exclusion of a physician from a funder’s ‘provider network’4.  
It is important to recognise that a funder undertaking the profiling of physician 
performance has no direct ability to impact on how the physician practices. The 
funder can only use incentives, education and relationships to encourage 
behaviour change. This may also involve working with the professional societies 
to which physicians’ belong in order to help induce changes in practice behaviour.  
3.2 Features of the healthcare service market that necessitate 
profiling 
The price charged for the provision of healthcare services is not controlled by the 
competitive market forces affecting other commodities (Arrow, 1963; Mushkin, 
1958; Zweifel, Breyer, & Kifmann, 2009) and as a result physicians need to be 
monitored in order to ensure they are operating efficiently. There are three main 
reasons for this, namely: ‘information asymmetry’, ‘supplier-induced demand’ 
and the ‘third-party payer problem’. There exists substantial information 
asymmetry between patients and physicians (Arrow, 1963; Zweifel et al., 2009). 
This is because physicians have superior knowledge as to the consequences and 
possibilities of a particular treatment. Medical knowledge is complicated and 
                                                          
4 A ‘provider network’ is a set of designated physicians and/or health care facilities that 
the funder has chosen will deliver specific healthcare services to their beneficiaries. The 
physician must agree to specified reimbursement and/or practice parameters to remain a 




patients do not have the relevant education to question the method of treatment 
advised by their physician. This is further exacerbated by the fact that patients are 
often in a physically and mentally vulnerable state when needing treatment. Even 
patients with medical knowledge will struggle to make informed decisions in such 
a state (Zweifel et al., 2009).  As a result, patients have to trust that their 
physicians are acting in their best interest and not in an attempt to maximise 
profits (Arrow, 1963). As patients have insufficient information with which to 
question the price they are being charged, information asymmetry gives 
physicians substantial power over patients regarding what they charge for their 
services. Furthermore, patients often are not provided with the price of treatment 
in advance because it depends on factors that are initially unknown, such as the 
diagnosis and the patient’s recovery rate (Arrow, 1963). This largely constrains 
the patient from shopping for the cheapest price of their treatment needs.  
Physicians play a dual role in relation to their patients. They are both the provider 
of healthcare services and the advisor of the services demanded by patients 
(Zweifel et al., 2009). The consequence of information asymmetry is that this 
advisory role changes into one where the physician potentially acts as the 
‘decider’ of the level and nature of services to be demanded. This leads to 
‘supplier-induced demand’; a phenomenon where the purchase of healthcare 
services by patients is higher than what would have been the case if there was no 
information asymmetry. The physician is granted substantial power to control the 
quantity of services demanded by their patients. An incentive is subsequently 
created for physicians to stray away from efficient performance and provide 
unnecessary excess treatment for their own financial gain (Zweifel et al., 2009). 
In addition, having health insurance removes the incentive on the part of patients 
to shop around for the best price of their healthcare needs (Mataconis, 2011). 
Patients have no financial incentive to take into consideration the price they are 
being charged when they are not paying the bill. This is known as the ‘third-party 
payer problem’ (Mataconis, 2011). The result is that physicians are able to charge 
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inflated prices without competitive market forces pushing them down (Mushkin, 
1958).  
For these reasons funders are required to profile physician practices to ensure that 
they are not abusing their price-setting power and not wasting healthcare 
resources. 
3.3 Methods 
Regardless of the profiling methodology that may be chosen, it is imperative that 
it exhibits two key features in order to yield physician profiles that can provide 
effective and useful performance improvements. First, the model must incorporate 
“adequate risk-adjustment to prevent systematic misclassification of providers due 
to differences in case mix” (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 2013, p. 731).  Case-mix 
adjustment attempts to remove the effect of differences in performance 
attributable solely to differences in the population treated by a specific physician 
(Christiansen & Morris, 1997; Normand et al., 1997). Examples of such 
differences include patient characteristics (such as age, gender and health status), 
as well as the type and severity of condition for which the patient is being treated. 
(Further details on case-mix adjustment are discussed in Section 5.2). The second 
feature is that the model must exhibit “adequate reliability to prevent random 
misclassification of physicians because of chance. When profiles have low 
reliability, they are driven by random chance instead of true performance, and 
interventions based on them may arbitrarily and unfairly penalize or reward 
physicians” (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 2013, p. 731). In other words, reliability 
ensures that the variation between the efficiency profiles of physicians can more 
confidently be interpreted as resulting from true variation in efficiency and not 
from random chance. For profiles to be reliable, a large sample of physicians need 
to be profiled and a large volume of clinical data is required to ensure that each 
physician is being profiled based on their performance in treating a sufficiently 
large number of patients. This achieves statistical reliability as it ensures that the 
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variation between physicians’ performance is sufficiently large relative to the 
variation of performance within physicians’ practices (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 
2013). 
It should also be noted that the profiling models used by funders are often built in-
house and represent a method for funders to gain a competitive advantage over 
their peers. This is because a superior profiling method provides a funder with 
superior ability to assess the performance of physicians. As a result, the funder 
can better affect physician performance improvements, more accurately set 
performance remuneration levels, and more effectively select physicians for 
inclusion in their provider networks. Consequently, the details of the profiling 
methods used by funders are often intellectual property (IP) and are thus not 
available to the public. As a result, this Section does not describe the details of the 
methods used by specific funders but instead describes the main categories of 
profiling methods used. 
One of the prominent methods of physician profiling in the United States are risk 
assessment models.  Risk assessment in the context of physician profiling 
considers whether the expenditure of a particular physician in treating its patients 
is greater than that which was expected (Lodh, Raleigh, Uccello, & Winkelman, 
2010). This involves the funder using one of a number of available models to 
estimate the expected cost of physician services to be reimbursed by the funder 
for treating the physicians particular population of patients and then comparing 
this with the actual cost of services provided (Pope & Kautter, 2007). Inefficient 
physicians are those whose actual costs exceed the expected amount; given 
quality of care provided, demographic characteristics and the health status of the 
physician’s patient population (i.e. adjusting for case-mix and quality) (Thomas, 
Grazier, & Ward, 2004). The type of risk assessment model used to estimate the 
expected cost of treating the patients’ defines how the results should be 
interpreted. For example, if the predicted costs are based on average patient 
expenditures then the efficiency measure will be relative to an average and not the 
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most efficient physicians (Pope & Kautter, 2007). The various methods in which 
risk assessment models estimate patients’ expected treatment costs differ by the 
information that they use to adjust for case-mix and the factors that are seen to 
affect resource utilisation and quality of care (Lodh et al., 2010). Examples of 
proprietary risk assessment models available for purchase by funders from 
software vendors include: Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs), Episode Risk Groups 
(ERGs), Medstat Episode Groups (MEGs) and Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) 
(Cumming, Knutson, Cameron, & Derrick, 2002; Winkelman & Mehmud, 2007). 
Another profiling method that is widely implemented is the use of statistical 
techniques. There are a number of techniques that are used to detect quality of 
care, resource cost and usage outliers. Smith (1994) uses an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) approach to analyse patient mortality rates of particular healthcare 
providers and thereby allocate the total variance according to severity of illness, 
quality of care and random fluctuation. Christiansen and Morris (1997) address 
the use of significance testing to determine if patient mortality rates of providers 
are significantly higher than those expected. A Poisson distribution is assigned to 
mortality rates. The null hypothesis of the test is that a provider’s true mortality 
rate equals the average rate for all providers. Gillis and Hixson (1991) regress 
mortality rates using Monte Carlo simulation to determine the predicted change in 
the rate when specific factors are varied. Hierarchal regression modelling has also 
been extensively used to analyse variations in healthcare utilisation and outcomes 
(Normand et al., 1997). Parente (2002) discusses the use of multivariate 
regression to profile physicians by using logistic regression analysis of patient 
outcomes treated by a specific physician. Dependent variables are chosen which 
are believed to significantly affect resource utilisation and quality of care. The 
dependent variables are also chosen to account for case-mix and patient attributes.  
The final method to consider is the frontier-analysis approach to profiling. This 
method is the focus of this study and as yet is not used in South Africa. Frontier 
analysis has, however, been shown to be an effective profiling technique in 
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academic literature (Andes, Metzger, Kralewski, & Gans, 2002; Wagner, 
Shimshak, & Novak, 2003). Frontier analysis defines physician efficiency relative 
to the set of ‘best practice’ physicians who exhibit the highest level of efficiency 
out of all the physicians being profiled (Lovell, 2006). Accordingly, the most 
efficient physicians make up what is known as a “best practice frontier”, and the 
rest of the physicians lie at lower levels of efficiency within the frontier. 
Efficiency is determined relative to the most efficient physicians within the 
particular sample. Frontier analysis, therefore, profiles physicians against a 
practice-based norm and does not provide an absolute measure of efficiency. The 
two most prominent frontier techniques are Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
and DEA. SFA is a parametric technique, which assumes two sources of 
fluctuation around a minimum total-cost function (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & 
Battese, 2005). The first source of fluctuation is the inefficiency residual, which 
arises from the assumption that all firms are inefficient. The second source is a 
normally distributed error term, which accounts for noise (Ozcan, 2008). SFA can 
be used for hypothesis testing as well as measuring various types of efficiency. 
Profiling using SFA (or any of the other methods above) is not considered in this 
study. Profiling is performed exclusively using DEA. The details regarding the 
evaluation of efficiency using DEA are described in detail in Section 5. 
3.4 Practical considerations 
There are a number of issues that may potentially complicate the physician 
profiling methods discussed above. These can be divided into a number of 
different categories. Only those relating to the presentation of the profiling results 
to respective parties and their subsequent behaviour are discussed in this section. 
The issues relating to the choice and measurement of inputs and outputs as well as 
those relating to the profiling model construction and interpretation are discussed 
throughout Section 5. Those relating to the data used in the profiling methodology 
are discussed in Section 6. 
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Physicians and patients often do not understand or appreciate the results of the 
profiling process (Charvet, 2009) as well as the process itself. This may lead to 
the unfounded mistrust of physicians by patients. Consequently, deterioration in 
the relationship between the physicians and funder may ensue (Shapiro et al., 
1993). Therefore, particular care needs to be taken to ensure that the profiling of 
physicians is a constructive process and not one that undermines the relationships 
between the parties involved in the financing and delivery of healthcare services 
(Lasker et al., 1992). One way this could possibly be achieved is by ensuring that 
the profiling methodology is as objective and accurate as possible, as well as 
exhibiting particular sensitivity regarding the manner in which the results are 
presented to the relevant parties. 
The profiling methodology can result in physician behaviour that is adverse to the 
intended objectives of the process. An example of this is a profiling methodology 
that is too focused on resource utilisation and cost reduction. The result of such a 
methodology runs the risk of adverse behaviour on the part of physicians. 
Physicians may refuse to treat potentially high resource patients in order to 
increase their perceived efficiency (Charvet, 2009). Alternatively, physicians will 
accept to treat all patients but engage in widespread under-servicing of these 
patients to artificially augment efficiency levels. 
In addition, profiling identifies those physicians that are considered to be 
resource, quality or cost inefficient compared to their peers or some standard 
norm. Those physicians may then be notified of their inefficiency. The results of 
the profiling process may then be conveyed in order to provide them with an 
understanding of how they can increase their efficiency in the future. The problem 
with focusing only on improvement interventions of inefficient physicians is that 
the perceived efficient physicians have no motivation to further strive for 
increased efficiency (Lasker et al., 1992).  
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Finally, the efficiency improvements informed by the profiling process need to be 
aligned with what is operationally achievable by physicians practicing in their 
specific environment (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1997). For example, increasing 
efficiency by incentivising physicians to substitute admissions to hospital with 
procedures performed in their own offices. An example of an operationally 
unrealistic strategy would be to advise physicians to improve efficiency by 
substituting the use of anaesthetist services with pharmaceutical painkillers. Such 
a strategy may theoretically improve efficiency but is clinically unfeasible. The 
above example illustrates that physician profiles need to be interpreted while 
keeping in mind feasible and acceptable physician practice styles (Chilingerian & 
Sherman, 1997).  
The description of the methodology in Section 8 attempts to address as many of 
these profiling issues, in order to achieve as effective a profiling methodology as 
possible.  It is pertinent to note, however, that even if these issues persist some 
experts still argue “that physicians will prefer profiling over other review 
techniques because annual review profiles focus on the use of resources and 
quality outcomes rather than on clinical decision-making” (Kassirer, 1994, p. 
634).  In other words, physician profiling does not require telling physician how 
to do their job, it rather requires of them to achieve stated resource utilisation and 





4 The production transformation process and 
the definition of efficiency5 
From the above discussion on physician profiling it can be seen that the focus is 
on improving physician’s efficiency and providing an understanding of how to 
rectify inefficiencies where they occur. In section 5, DEA is discussed as a 
method of achieving the objectives of physician profiling. A starting requirement 
is to frame profiling as the comparison of physicians’ relative ability to efficiently 
transform their inputs into outputs of production. Thereafter, it is required to use 
the production transformation process to define efficiency in its various forms.  
4.1 The production transformation process 
A physician can be thought of as a firm like any other with a production process 
transforming inputs into outputs. The term ‘outputs’ refers to the products or 
services that the firm produces, while ‘inputs’ refer to the resources used by the 
firm to produce the outputs (Figure 4.1). Coelli et al. (2005) provide a simple 
example of a production transformation process where a shirt factory uses 
materials, labour and capital (inputs) to make shirts (output). It is important to 
make explicit that for a particular profiling process a single production 
transformation process is conceptualised applicable to all the physicians. 
Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that all physicians use the same inputs, albeit in 
different quantities, to produce the same outputs; and, furthermore, that all 
physicians have equal access to these inputs (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011b). 
This assumption is indispensible as the profiling of different processes would 
provide limited information of value.   
                                                          
5 The definitions of the different types of efficiency described in this section derive from 
those in Coelli et al. (2005) who in turn derived the definitions from the work  of Färe, 
Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985), Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994), Lovell (1993), Farrell 








In the profiling methodology used in this study, the physicians’ inputs of 
production are the cost of healthcare services used to treat patients. The 
physicians’ output of production is the case-mix adjusted number of patients that 
they treat within a given period. Therefore, the production transformation process 
is the physicians’ practice of ‘producing’ treated patients through the utilisation of 
healthcare services (for example, surgery, anaesthetist and hospital services). The 
conceptualisation of physicians’ production transformation process in this study, 
with the inputs and outputs of production, is an important part of the profiling 
methodology discussed in detail in Section 6.1.  
Considering the characteristics of the production process is important as it ensures 
that profiling begins with understanding the responsibilities of the physician in the 
treatment of their patients. In particular, this involves understanding the decisions 
made by the physicians regarding the requisite healthcare services they utilised to 
produce a treated population of patients. Thanassoulis (2001) explains that by not 
considering a physicians production process the profiler runs the risk of 
comparing efficiency based on production variables outside the control of the 
physician. A proper understanding of the production process ensures, first, that the 
outputs used in the comparison of physician efficiency are actually affected by the 
inputs. Second, that profiling evaluates a holistic picture of the physicians’ 
practices by including all the inputs responsible for affecting the outputs 
(Thanassoulis, 2001). Expressed in an example, conceptualising the production 
process of the shirt factory ensures that the quantity of materials used actually 
Inputs Outputs                                     
Physician j 
xj yj 
Figure 4.1     Basic illustration of physician production transformation process 
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affects the number of shirts made and that all the inputs affecting the number of 
shirts made are included in the process (Coelli et al., 2005).  
Considering the activities of physicians as production processes is also an 
essential first step in using a DEA profiling approach. This is because it frames 
the way in which efficiency is defined and interpreted (Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001; 
Thanassoulis, 2001). 
4.2 Defining efficiency 
Utilising a DEA approach to profile performance comprises an efficiency analysis 
within physicians’ production transformation process. ‘Efficiency’ goes a step 
further than conceptualising the production process; it requires consideration of 
the optimal way a firm (in this case a physician) uses its inputs to produce the 
intended outputs. Thus, ‘optimality’ dictates efficiency (Balk, 2001). Different 
measures of efficiency are described in the subsections that follow. It should be 
noted that throughout the descriptions of the various forms of efficiency, a given 
technology is assumed. The ‘technology’ is the exogenously determined 
environment in which the firm operates that defines the set of feasible 
combinations of input and output quantities (this will be discussed in detail in 
Section 5.3) (Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001; Balk, 2001).  
4.2.1 Technical efficiency 
Koopmans (1951, p. 60) provides the seminal definition of technical efficiency; 
“an input-output vector is technically efficient if, and only if, increasing any 
output or decreasing any input is possible only by decreasing some other output or 
increasing some other input”. Technical efficiency thus reflects the firm’s ability 
to obtain the maximum level of outputs from a given level of inputs or obtaining a 
given level of output from the minimum level of inputs (Coelli et al., 2005).  
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Koopman’s (1951) definition was proposed for the purpose of analysing the 
technical efficiency of production for entire economies. Farrell (1957) extended 
the above Koopmans (1951) definition of technical efficiency by applying it at the 
individual firm level and “used the performances of other firms to evaluate the 
behaviour of each firm relative to the outputs and the inputs each of the other 
firms used” (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011a, p. 5). This made it possible to 
evaluate firms’ relative technical efficiencies.  
The Farrell (1957)  definition of relative technical efficiency is further refined by 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) in the seminal work on DEA, and is the 
definition used in this investigation: “A firm is to be rated as fully (100%) 
efficient on the basis of available evidence if and only if the performances of other 
firms do not show that some of its inputs or outputs can be improved without 
worsening some of its other inputs or outputs”. This efficiency definition better 
emphasises its ‘relative’ nature. It does not assume that theoretically possible 
levels of efficiency are known but rather emphasises that efficiency is defined 
using only the information that is empirically available (Cooper et al., 2011b). 
The above definition of relative technical efficiency is best illustrated in an 
example. Assume that the only input needed by a physician to treat a patient is 
hospital services. Then a physician is relatively technical efficient compared to 
other physicians profiled if it is able to treat a given number of patients using the 
lowest level of hospital services, or if it is able to treat the most patients using a 
given level of hospital services. 
4.2.2 Allocative efficiency 
Farrell (1957) also formulated a definition of allocative efficiency by extracting 
information from the price of the inputs and outputs. Allocative efficiency entails 
selecting the optimal mix of inputs that produces a given level of output at the 
minimum cost, or by selecting the optimal mix of outputs that will maximise 
revenue using a given level of inputs (Coelli et al., 2005). Thus, allocative 
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efficiency reflects the firm’s ability to utilise available inputs and/or produce 
intended outputs in the optimal proportions. Farrell (1957) went on to define total 
economic (or overall productive) efficiency as the product of technical and 
allocative efficiency (Färe et al., 1994).  
4.2.3 Scale efficiency 
Färe et al. (1994) decomposed technical efficiency into three components, one of 
which being scale efficiency. A firm may be technically and allocatively efficient 
but may benefit from changing the scale of its operations (Coelli et al., 2005). A 
firm is said to be scale efficient when its size of operations is optimal, so that any 
modifications to its size will reduce the firm’s efficiency. For example, if a 
physician is able to increase its efficiency by increasing the size of its practice and 
treating more patients, then it is not scale efficient. The relationship between 
technical and scale efficiency is considered in the discussion of the return-to-scale 
properties of DEA models in Section 5.3. 
4.2.4 Price efficiency 
The final type of efficiency important to discuss is price efficiency. A firm is price 
efficient when all production inputs are purchased at the lowest possible price 
(Sherman & Zhu, 2006). The measurement of price efficiency thus requires data 
in order to determine the price of inputs into production. A firm can increase its 
price efficiency if it is able to purchase its inputs at a lower price, without 
sacrificing the quality of those inputs (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). For example, if a 
physician is able to purchase hospital services (such operating theatre time) to 
treat patients at a lower price in a hospital of equivalent quality then it is able to 
increase its price efficiency. The measurement of price efficiency is, however, 
complicated as there are many factors that influence the price efficiency of a firm 
(Coelli et al., 2005). The price efficiency of a physician practice is determined by 
the competition of the healthcare environment in which the physician practices 
(Zweifel et al., 2009). For example, the price efficiency of a surgeon relying 
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heavily on hospital services to treat its patients is determined by the price 
competition in the hospital industry. Price efficiency is also a function of the 
physicians bargaining power when purchasing services used to treat patients 




5 Data Envelopment Analysis6 
5.1 Introduction 
As previously mentioned, this study investigates the use of DEA as a method to 
profile physicians. Throughout the description of DEA in this section, reference is 
made to Figure 5.1 in order to graphically depict the pertinent issues discussed. 
DEA is a data-orientated non-parametric mathematical optimisation technique 
conceived by Farrell (1957) and later developed and disseminated by Charnes et 
al. (1978). DEA is a form of frontier analysis that uses linear programming to 
measure the relative efficiency of firms (Ozcan, 2008). By comparing firm’s 
production process (discussed in Section 4.1), DEA provides a relative measure of 
a firm’s ability to efficiently transform their inputs into outputs (Bogetoft & Otto, 
2010).  
DEA assumes that the production transformation process and the chosen inputs 
and outputs of production are the same for all the firms being analysed (Cooper et 
al., 2011b). The evaluation of efficiency is relative to other firms’ practices 
(‘practice-based’ norm), rather than a theoretical notion of efficiency (‘standards-
based’ norm). DEA, therefore, requires that an inefficient firm achieve the 
performance attained by efficient firms in order to be deemed efficient. Some 
profiling experts believe that recommendations made to inefficient physicians in 
this form may receive less resistance because they are based on what better 
practicing physicians actually accomplished using the same technological path 
taken by the inefficient physician (Chilingerian, 1995). Thus DEA says to 
inefficient firms: “These evaluations are not based on some pure notion of 
                                                          
6 Throughout this discussion on the theory of DEA, emphasis is made concerning 
assumptions underlying the DEA approach; since violation of these underlying 
assumptions will jeopardise the validity of any results obtained from the model. These 




efficiency, but on what your peers with better practices actually accomplished. 
How come your peers can do it better than you?” (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990, 
















DEA is by no means a tool reserved for use in the application of physician 
profiling. It is a method that has been used to measure the relative efficiency of 
firms in numerous and varied production environments. Charnes et al. (1978) 









Figure 5.1    Graphical representation of a 1-input-1-output DEA best practice 
frontier of efficient DMUs along with the ‘true’ best practice frontier, the defined 
technology sets as well as the inefficient DMUs  








‘decision-making units’ (DMUs). Agrell and Bogetoft (2001) explain that one can 
characterise a DMU as any entity that transforms resources (inputs) into products 
and services (outputs). In other words, a DMU is any firm that has a production 
transformation process. Understandably, the choice of DMU is dependent on the 
practical area in which DEA is being applied. In addition, the choice of the DMU 
determines the types of inputs and outputs of production used in the measurement 
of efficiency (Thanassoulis, 2001). Therefore, in the application of DEA to 
physician profiling the DMUs are the physicians being profiled, the inputs are the 
healthcare services used by the physician to treat patients, and the output is the 
physician’s treated population of patients. Further examples of the DMUs 
applicable to the healthcare environment are hospitals, nursing homes and day 
clinics.  In keeping with the above, ‘DMUs’ is used throughout the theoretical 
description of DEA to refer to the sample of firms whose efficiency is being 
analysed. 
Only ‘classic’ DEA models are considered to form part of the profiling 
methodology followed in this investigation. Classic DEA models are limited to 
those maintaining the assumption that production activities can be characterised as 
a deterministic process of transforming quantifiable and homogenous inputs into 
quantifiable and homogenous outputs (Kuosmanen, 2001a). “Therefore, it is 
assumed that any stochastic variations in the process as well as any quality 
differences and non-measurable factors are assumed non-existing, negligible for 
the purposes of the analysis, or ‘correctable’ by means of some kind of data pre-
processing” (Kuosmanen, 2001b, p. 9). DEA models allowing for stochastic 
variation of variables are known as ‘stochastic’ DEA models; however, these 
models are not considered in this study. Furthermore, classic DEA models are 
‘proportional’, in the sense that all the inputs or outputs of DMUs need to be 
reduced or augmented in the same proportion in order for efficiency to be 
increased (Ozcan, 2008). There exist alternative DEA models that simultaneously 
aim to achieve both input reduction and output augmentation. In such models the 
39 
 
input reduction and output augmentation need not be proportional (Ozcan, 2008). 
These models are known as ‘additive’ or ‘non-oriented’ models, however, these 
models are also not considered.  
Many profiling studies have been limited to the analysis of efficiency based on the 
use of a specific resource, such as pathology or radiology services (InterStudy, 
1989).  Chilingerian and Sherman (1997) stress, however, that if profiles are to 
approximate a physician’s performance, they should include the multiple 
healthcare services that physicians utilise to treat their populations of patients. For 
ease of illustration, Figure 5.1 portrays a single-input single-output model, 
however, DEA explicitly allows for multiple inputs and multiple outputs to be 
incorporated into the model (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, DEA requires very 
few a priori assumptions to be made regarding the nature of the chosen inputs and 
outputs, unlike standard forms of statistical regression analysis (Ozcan, 2008). As 
a result, “DEA has opened up possibilities for use in cases that have been resistant 
to other approaches because of the complex (often unknown) nature of the 
relations between the multiple inputs and multiple outputs involved in firms” 
(Cooper et al., 2011a, pp. 1, 2).  
DEA analyses DMUs observed input-output combinations and uses these to 
develop a frontier of the most efficient DMUs against which all inefficient firms 
are compared (Ozcan, 2008). All DMUs in the sample that fall within the frontier 
are relatively inefficient compared to those that make up the efficient frontier 
(Figure 5.1). This is in contrast to other efficiency evaluation techniques that 
compare each firm relative to a central tendency by trying, for example, to fit a 
regression plane through the centre of the data; as is common in statistical 
regression (Chilingerian, 1995; Cooper et al., 2011a). This contrast is represented 
in Figure 5.1 by noting the difference between determining a firm’s efficiency 
relative to the ‘DEA frontier’ as opposed to the ‘regression line’. This is valuable 
in profiling applications as it encourages inefficient physicians to strive to emulate 
the practices of the observed ‘best’ physicians rather than just aiming to be above 
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average (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). Chilingerian and Sherman (1997, p. 36) 
elaborate that “efficiency comparison should not be made based on prevailing 
practice standards or norms reflecting the average behaviour of physicians over 
time” and “averaging profiles will not pinpoint how an individual physician 
achieved a best practice”. Furthermore, only large improvements in physician 
efficiency, likes those achieved by comparison with best-practice, can contain 
escalating health care costs (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1997).  
 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), Kuosmanen (2001b) and Bogetoft and Otto 
(2010) consider the measurement of relative efficiency using DEA comprising 
three distinct parts. The first is determining the purpose that DEA is to be applied 
within the chosen production environment. This involves the conceptualisation of 
the production process and the corresponding definition of efficiency upon which 
performance is based (discussed in Section 4). This part also includes the choice 
of the particular DMUs whose efficiency is to be evaluated and the variable 
selection process of the inputs and outputs. The second is defining the production 
possibility set (which Bogetoft and Otto (2010) term the ‘technology set’ or just 
the ‘technology’), and the third is considering the method used to measure 
efficiency. The remainder of this section provides a detailed explanation of these 
three parts as well as the classic DEA models arising from their combination.  In 
so doing, a detailed description is provided of the theory and rationale behind the 
DEA profiling methodology used in this study.  
 
5.2 The choice of DMUs, inputs and outputs 
As stated previously, the purpose to which DEA is being applied is the profiling 
of physicians in order for a funder to compare their relative efficiency. The DMUs 
are the individual physicians being profiled and thus the process is performed 
within the healthcare environment in which physicians practice.  Furthermore, the 
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conceptualization of the physicians’ production transformation process and the 
various definitions of efficiency are discussed in Section 4.  
5.2.1 Choice of DMUs 
With the above in mind, further consideration is needed regarding the choice of 
physician; comprising the DMUs under investigation. Profiling must be 
performed separately on different types of physicians. For example, the profiling 
of psychologists is performed and interpreted separately from that of 
gynaecologists (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). Comparing the efficiency of a 
psychologist to that of a gynaecologist provides no meaningful information to the 
funder or the respective physicians profiled. The physician types profiled are 
chosen based on the funder’s interest in analysing their efficiency. The funder 
may profile all or only a subset of the physicians of a particular type. As discuss 
in Section 3, whether a specific subset of a funder’s physician can be effectively 
profiled will depend largely on the volume and accuracy of data available as well 
as whether there is sufficient detailed information to perform adequate case-mix 
adjustment. The choice of physician type, therefore, depends on whether the 
above data requirements are achievable (discussed further in Section 6.4).  
5.2.2 Choice of inputs and outputs 
Regardless of the type of physician being profiled, there are no prescribed inputs 
and outputs that have to be used in a profiling process (Thanassoulis, 2001). DEA 
does provide some guidance by demanding that the choice of input-output 
variables included in a DEA profiling process depend on the conceptualisation of 
the production transformation process, the type of efficiency being assessed, the 
environment in which profiling is being applied, the type of physician being 
profiled as well as the factors that are and are not under the control of the 
physician (Thanassoulis, 2001). This, however, still results in the problem 
encountered in all profiling techniques, of choosing the most appropriate inputs 
and outputs. Thanassoulis (2001, p. 89) cautions that the “identification of the 
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input-output variables to be used in an assessment of comparative performance is 
the first and arguably the most important stage in carrying out the assessment. The 
results obtained depend crucially on the choice made”.  
As a result of the above, the starting point of identifying appropriate input and 
output variables requires professional and pragmatic judgment by individuals that 
are knowledgeable regarding the type of efficiency being assessed and the 
transformation of inputs to outputs within the given environment (Golany & Roll, 
1989). There are, however, certain important principles governing the choice of 
the input-output variables. The six core requirements that inputs and outputs must 
exhibit when profiling using any method are that they be distinct, measurable, 
quantifiable, homogenous, accurate and that there be as few inputs and outputs as 
possible (Ozcan, 2008). When profiling physicians using DEA, inputs and outputs 
must exhibit the additional requirement of being exhaustive (Thanassoulis, 2001). 
These requirements are discussed in turn including how they affect the choice of 
physicians included in the profiling process. 
Distinct inputs and outputs are ones that do not overlap. This applies to profiling 
methods that have multiple input and/or output variables (Thanassoulis, 2001). 
Distinct inputs and outputs are important as they allow the overall level of 
efficiency to be decomposed in order to identify the affect that a particular input 
or output has on the overall efficiency level. If the variables overlap it is uncertain 
as to what extent a specific input or output is contributing to the inefficiency when 
interpreting the results (Kittelsen, 1993). In addition, ensuring that each variable is 
distinct ensures that all additional inputs and outputs pooled are adding ‘value’ to 
the model in explaining the production transformation process (Wagner & 
Shimshak, 2007). In other words, this helps ensure that redundant variables are 
not included in the analysis; they are just linear combinations of other variables. 
Furthermore, this helps meet the requirement (discussed below) of including as 
few inputs and outputs as possible (Thanassoulis, 2001).  Also, distinct inputs and 
outputs avoid overweighting the impact of a particular variable; this is done by 
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preventing it from being represented in multiple inputs or outputs in the model 
(Kittelsen, 1993). Ensuring that the inter-correlation is acceptably low between 
the inputs and between the outputs chosen is necessary to ensure that this 
requirement is met (Wagner & Shimshak, 2007; Wagner et al., 2003).  
It seems obvious that inputs and outputs can only be included if their values are 
measurable and quantifiable (Coelli et al., 2005). Physician profiling ideally 
requires the measurement of variables that describe the true nature of service 
production (Ozcan, 2008). However, in practice, profiling often involves the use a 
related variable as proxy to an input or output that is not measurable and/or 
quantifiable (Ozcan, 2008). For example, if the utilisation of radiology services is 
unknown then the number of x-rays performed may be used as a proxy (Ozcan, 
1998; Ozcan, Jiang, & Pai, 2000). It is important to be sure that the proxy 
appropriately reflects the nature of the underlying variable; otherwise physician 
performance will be determined by an undesired measure of efficiency.  
A related requirement is that the definition and measurement of the inputs and 
outputs be homogenous (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). The healthcare 
environment poses three main sources of heterogeneity affecting the level of 
inputs and outputs used in the profiling of physicians. First, inputs and outputs can 
vary significantly depending on the volume and scope of services provided by a 
particular physician as well as by the severity of the patients they treat 
(Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990; Ozcan, 2008). This is the reason necessitating 
adequate case-mix adjustment in all profiling methods (Chilingerian & Sherman, 
1990). The importance of case-mix adjustment is revisited later in this section.  
Second, the inputs and outputs of physicians can vary considerably based on the 
quality of services provided. Possible methods of allowing for quality differences 
in the model are by including quality measures as inputs, outputs or exogenous 
factors of production (Eckermann & Coelli, 2008). Quality differences are, 
however, notoriously difficult to measure and adjust-for in the healthcare context 
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(Ozcan, 2008).  Alternatively, the physicians profiled can be chosen provided they 
exhibit similar characteristics regarding their quality of care; thereby avoiding the 
need for quality adjustments (Eckermann & Coelli, 2008; Ozcan, 2008). Due to 
the challenges posed, quality of care is often assumed (implicitly or explicitly) to 
be constant across all physicians (Hollingsworth, 2008). This is, in fact, the 
assumption made in this study. The consequences of this on the interpretation of 
the profiling results obtained are discussed in detail in Section 8. 
Third, input measurement may also exhibit heterogeneity due to differences in the 
“pricing of input units, supply and materials or labour costs across healthcare 
facilities depending upon region” (Ozcan, 2008, p. 13). The result of this is that 
technical efficiency cannot be differentiated from price efficiency.  
A method to mitigate all the above sources of heterogeneity, and to ensure that the 
profiling process is comparing ‘apples with apples’, is to ensure that the 
physicians chosen to be profiled belong to the same ‘peer-group’ (Ozcan, 2008). 
In other words, physicians are chosen that have similar characteristics and are 
seen to be similar in the types of inputs and outputs used as well as in the way 
these inputs are used to produce outputs. This is a further reason why different 
types of physicians are profiled separately. 
The measurement of inputs and outputs needs to be accurate (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Any errors or omitted data resulting from, for example, bad reporting practices 
can potentially have a significant distorting effect on profiling results. Bogetoft 
and Otto (2010) and Kuosmanen (2001b) explain that this is a particular problem 
in DEA models due to the fact that it is a non-parametric approach and does thus 
does not include a stochastic error term. The data checks used to ensure accuracy 
in this study are discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
As stated above, the linear programming models used in carrying out classic DEA 
are non-parametric, and thus do not make initial assumptions regarding the 
functional form of the technology set or efficiency frontier (Bogetoft & Otto, 
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2010). It is, therefore, assumed that only the observed inputs and outputs 
determine the level of efficiency. Deviation from the frontier is a result solely of 
inefficient operations and in no-part from a chosen stochastic error term (Ozcan, 
2008). Exhaustiveness, thus, requires that the included inputs in a DEA approach 
(and they alone) fully represent the level of the outputs. Thanassoulis (2001, p. 
90) elaborates that “the input variables need to capture all the resources and the 
output variables all the outcomes”. Conversely, only inputs and outputs that are 
necessary to explain the production transformation process should be included in 
the model (Kittelsen, 1993; Wagner et al., 2003). Furthermore, any environmental 
factors that affect the transformation of inputs into outputs should be included as 
part of the input or output set, depending on the direction of impact of the 
environmental factor (Thanassoulis, 2001). The exhaustiveness requirement can, 
however, be relaxed if it is assumed that any inputs or outputs omitted will not 
affect the results of the DEA analysis (Thanassoulis, 2001). Considering the 
correlations between the chosen inputs and outputs can assess the exhaustiveness 
of inputs and outputs (Thanassoulis, 2001; Wagner & Shimshak, 2007). 
Finally, the challenge of the variable selection process conducted when profiling 
physicians using DEA is to find a parsimonious model, “using as many input and 
output variables as needed but as few as possible” (Wagner & Shimshak, 2007, p. 
58); all of which exhibit the requirements discussed above. Jenkins and Anderson 
(2003) and Golany and Roll (1989) explain that the greater the number of 
variables the less power the model has at discerning true variations in physician 
efficiency from random fluctuations.  
5.2.3 Case-mix adjustment 
The necessity of adequate case-mix adjustment when profiling physician 
performance has been expressed in prior sections. However, because case-mix 
adjustment is such an important methodological requirement of effective 
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physician profiling, it is important to consolidate the reasons why it is needed and 
how it solves the problem of differences in case mix.  
The purpose of case-mix adjustment is to allow for the effective comparison of 
efficiency across physician profiles. Case-mix adjustment achieves this by acting 
as a corrective tool used to homogenise the characteristics of the patient 
populations treated by the profiled physicians (Salem-Schatz, Moore, Rucker, & 
Pearson, 1994). The result of case-mix adjustment is the comparison of physicians 
with patient populations that are similar regarding their health and resource 
consumption requirements (Jencks & Dobson, 1987). Not adjusting for case-mix 
unfairly penalises physicians with higher risk patients; for example, those with 
older and sicker patients, as well as those treating more severe conditions. Case-
mix adjustment allows for a comparable analysis where the focus lies on the 
practice pattern variation of physicians, instead of the differences in the patient 
population and their unique risk profile (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). 
Case-mix adjustment is applied to the inputs and/or outputs used. The 
considerations involved are the same as those explained above in the discussion 
on achieving homogenous inputs and outputs. The case-mix adjustment process 
followed in this investigation is discussed in detail in Section 6.5.1. 
5.2.4 Practice- vs. procedural-level analyses 
This study has explicitly chosen to undertake physician profiling by analysing the 
performance of each physician on a ‘practice level’. In other words, the study 
considers the relative efficiency of physicians’ ability to treat all their patients 
during a particular period. Examples of this approach are the investigations 
performed by Chillingerian and Sherman (1995; 1997) as well as Wagner et al. 
(2003). Alternatively, profiling can be undertaken on a ‘procedural level’. In this 
case, the analysis would involve determining a physician’s efficiency in treating 
patients suffering from a particular health condition. Examples of this approach 
are Ozcan (2000) investigation comparing GPs and specialists efficiencies in 
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treating sinusitis patients as well as Ozcan (1998) investigation into the efficiency 
of GPs in treatment of otitis media.    
The above distinction is important to note as each approach has its advantages as 
well as imparting its own set of complications and limitations on the study. 
Analysis on a practice level has the major advantage that DEA is used to provide 
an indication of a physician’s relative efficiency of treating all their patients 
(Ozcan, 2008). Analysis on a procedural level requires that physicians’ efficiency 
to treat individual types of conditions be analysed separately (Ozcan, 2008). To 
get a sense of the overall efficiency of a physician, therefore, requires multiple 
analyses of all the distinct conditions treated by the physician. Apart from the 
extra work involved, this has the disadvantage of creating multiple criteria upon 
which to base the efficiency of a particular physician. The result of this is that the 
DEA analysis becomes little better than ratio analysis at determining the overall 
relative efficiency level of a physician. This idea is simplified by considering an 
example. Assume that there are three otorhinolaryngologists each exclusively 
treating three conditions, namely: asthma, sinusitis and otitis media. It is plausible 
that none of these physicians strictly dominate the others in their ability to 
efficiently treat patients with these conditions. This is in fact the case if each 
physician is found to be most efficient in treating one of the conditions. In this 
study hundreds of physicians are being analysed treating hundreds of conditions 
making it highly unlikely for a procedural-level analysis to provide a sense of a 
particular physicians overall level of efficiency relative to its peers. It can only be 
inferred from a procedural-level analysis that a physician is more efficient at 
treating a particular condition over its peers. This limits the usefulness of such an 
analysis to healthcare funders performing profiling activities. 
Furthermore, in order to adhere to the reliability requirement essential to all 
profiling methodologies, a procedural-level analysis can only be effectively 
performed for conditions treated by a significant number of physicians. In 
addition, these physicians will have to have treated a large enough volume of 
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patients with the condition. It is likely that few conditions will meet these criteria. 
Therefore, the procedural-level analysis can only give a very partial view of a 
physicians overall level of efficiency.  
The major advantage of the procedural-level analysis is its increased ability to 
homogenise the DEA process – a key DEA requirement discussed in Section 5.2.2 
above. The practice-level analysis considers the efficiency of physicians’ ability 
to treat patients requiring treatment for conditions that potentially vary 
considerably. Revisiting the previous example, one otorhinolaryngologists may 
exclusively treat asthma patients while the other two may treat an equal mix of all 
three conditions. As a result, it is imperative when undertaking a practice-level 
analysis to adjust for case-mix differences according to the resource intensity of 
the conditions treated (as discussed above in Section 5.2.3). A significant 
consequence of this is that the practice-level analysis suffers from the limitation 
that the accuracy of the results reflects the effectiveness of the case-mix 
adjustment technique used. Any heterogeneity not accounted for may jeopardise 
the level of accuracy of the results obtained (Coelli et al., 2005).  
In addition, when interpreting a particular physician’s efficiency score obtained 
from a practice-level analysis, the case-mix of the physician needs to be compared 
to that of its peers. This is necessary in order to ascertain whether it is clinically 
appropriate to compare the efficiency of particular physician to that of another. 
For example, a surgeon exclusively performing organ transplants should never be 
compared to one that performs predominantly colonoscopies. Even though the 
case-mix adjustment homogenises the two surgeons regarding resource utilisation, 
the nature, level and extent of any efficiency improvements achievable will be 
vastly different for the two surgeons given the varied clinical nature of their 
practices. This will require the results of a practice-level analysis to be interpreted 
with the aid of an individual with expert clinical knowledge of the physicians’ 
practices in order to make sound judgements in this regard.  
49 
 
Even though a procedural-level analysis will not require as extensive case-mix 
adjustment, it will still require case-mix adjustment regarding the severity of 
conditions treated (Ozcan, 1998; 2000). In addition, interpretation of the results 
needs to consider physician characteristics. For example, is it appropriate to 
compare two otorhinolaryngologists against each other on their ability to treat 
asthma where the one is an allergist possessing far great experience in treating 
such a condition? Or where one physician treats three times as many asthma 
patients as the other; thus benefiting from the scale and experience efficiencies 
this affords? Consequently, the results of a procedural-level analysis need to be 
interpreted in light of the characteristics of the physician; both contributing and 
impeding their ability to efficiently treat patients with a specific condition 
(Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). Such characteristics may be specific to a 
particular condition, further adding to the complexity in determining an overall 
view of a physician’s efficiency using a procedural-level analysis. 
A further complication of a procedural-level analysis is the inability to utilise 
classic DEA models. As is discussed in Section 5.4 below, classic DEA models 
make an assumption that the DMUs either achieve optimal efficiency through 
reduction of input levels (input-orientated) or through augmentation of output 
levels (output-orientated) (Ozcan, 2008). When undertaking a practice-level 
analysis, the input-orientated approach rests on the assumption that the physician 
does not actively attempt to augment the number of patients seen (Ozcan, 2008). 
Therefore, it assumes that the physician treats as many patients as demand the 
services for which the physician has the clinical skills to provide. This is a ‘weak’ 
assumption to make as it is highly plausible to occur in reality. When performing 
a procedural-level analysis this assumption is a lot more difficult to make. 
Illustrated using an example, an otorhinolaryngologist is likely to favour the 
treatment a particular condition (e.g. asthma), especially if he/she specialises in 
treating such a condition. As a result, using an input-orientated DEA approach 
when performing a procedural-level analysis is not appropriate, as the physician 
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may actively seek to augment their outputs (the number of patients treated with a 
particular condition). On the other hand, an output-orientated approach is also not 
appropriate since it cannot be assumed that the physician does not have control of 
the resources involved in treating their patients. As a result, a non-orientated DEA 
model is likely to be most appropriate (Ozcan, 2008). Such non-classic models 
add considerable complexity when carrying out and analysing DEA results. 
A final limitation of the procedural-level analysis is the dependence on the ability 
to accurately categorise patients into homogenous groups based on their 
conditions. Complications may arise due to poor billing practices by the physician 
as well as where patients have multiple conditions and/or comorbidities. Any 
deficiencies in the grouper system used to categorise patients become direct 
deficiencies in the DEA analysis. 
Upon consideration of the above issues, this study undertakes to perform a 
practice-level DEA analysis of physician efficiency. It is felt that such an analysis 
is best suited to answering the research question, which considers whether DEA is 
a useful profiling tool to provide an indication of physicians’ overall relative 
efficiency. The methodology followed in this study is not the only option when 
undertaking a DEA profiling analysis. The decision to perform a practice-level 
analysis reflects the view that it is most useful DEA profiling approach at this 
early stage of investigations of this kind in South African. This decision, 
therefore, in no way detracts from the value (or otherwise) to be gained from 
undertaking a procedural-level analysis. Finally, it is essential that the limitations 
arising when performing a practice-level analysis (discussed above) be kept in 
mind when analysing the results of this study. These limitations are considered in 






Once the DMUs, inputs and outputs have been chosen, and performance 
efficiency has been defined; the next step in the evaluation of efficiency using 
DEA is to define an appropriate technology. The technology specifies the set of 
combinations of input and output levels that are possible in the environment in 
which the DMUs production is taking place (Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001). In other 
words, it defines the input levels that can actually produce respective levels of 
output. Bogetoft and Otto (2010, p. 57) explain that the “technology shows how 
inputs can be turned into outputs, how inputs can be substituted for each other, 
how outputs depend on inputs, and whether outputs are the result of a joint or a 
united process”. The social, technical, mechanical, chemical, and biological 
environment in which the production process takes place determines the 
technology (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). Defining the technology is fundamental to 
the DEA process because it determines the set of possible performance outcomes 
against which the actual performance of a given firm can be evaluated (Bogetoft 
& Otto, 2010). In Figure 5.1, the technology is T*; it represents all the input-
output combinations possible under the ‘DEA frontier’ curve.   
The problem that often arises in practice is that there is insufficient a priori 
information about the true underlying technology (i.e. the true underlying 
technology is unknown) (Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001). It is therefore necessary to 
estimate the technology set based on observed data points and then to evaluate the 
observed production of a firm relative to the estimated technology. Figure 5.1 
explains this idea graphically. If there is full a priori information regarding the 
level of efficiency that is technologically possible for firms to achieve, then the 
best practice frontier will be the ‘true best practice’ frontier. The corresponding 
technology with be all the input-output combinations under this curve, represented 
by T. However, in practice there is insufficient a priori information to determine 
the ‘true best practice’ frontier. So instead, DEA uses the observed input and 
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output levels of the DMUs to determine an estimate for this frontier and the 
corresponding technology; as are represented by the ‘DEA frontier’ and T* in 
Figure 5.1. As a result, DEA does not determine the level of efficiency based on 
what is actually technologically possible in the environment. Instead, it is based 
on the optimal level of efficiency achieved by the analysed set of DMUs. 
5.3.1 Basic determinism postulate and minimum extrapolation principle 
The first requirement when estimating the DEA technology is known as the basic 
determinism postulate, “which states that the technology set should contain all 
observed DMUs” chosen to be analysed (Kuosmanen, 2001a, p. 3). It is this 
requirement, which results in efficiency being measured relative to other DMUs 
and not relative to an absolute norm of what is technologically achievable 
(Kuosmanen, 2001b). The basic determinism postulate, thus, requires that the 
technology be estimated by using the observations as the starting point. The 
technology set is then enlarged by adding assumptions that portray plausible 
characteristics of the production environment (Kuosmanen, 2001b). These 
assumptions provide the framework as to how the observations can be 
interpolated and extrapolated (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010), and thus determine the 
shape of the efficiency frontier generated from the efficient DMUs. From here on, 
the assumptions applied to the technology are referred to as ‘production 
assumptions’ in order to differentiate them from the other assumptions made in 
DEA. It is critically important to understand which production assumptions one 
can reasonably make, explicitly or implicitly, so that the resulting estimation of 
the true underling technology is congruous with the actual observations of input 
and output levels upon which it is based (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). Therefore, 
another requirement of the inputs and outputs chosen can be added to those 
discussed in Section 5.2.2. It is imperative that the inputs and outputs in the DEA 
profiling process adhere to the production assumptions constraining the 
technology set.  
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Before the individual production assumptions are discussed, it is important to note 
that DEA is not the only process that substitutes an underlying unknown 
technology set with an estimated one. This is commonly done in efficiency 
evaluations using traditional statistical methods and accounting approaches, 
among others (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). However, the manner in which the DEA 
process estimates the technology is different from that of other methods. The 
DEA process estimates the technology using the minimal extrapolation principle 
(Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001; Banker et al., 1984; Kuosmanen, 2001b). This means 
that during the DEA process the smallest possible technology set is constructed to 
contain all the observed DMU’s input-output combinations; as well as to satisfy 
the set of chosen production assumptions (Kuosmanen, 2001b). DEA thus makes 
a conservative estimate of the technology set, which results in a conservative 
estimate of a DMUs level of efficiency, as well as any loss due to inefficiency 
(Banker et al., 1984).  
The combination of the basic determinism postulate and the minimal extrapolation 
principal is that (1) no observed DMUs efficiency is determined relative to the 
absolute level of what is technologically achievable, and (2) DEA provides 
conservative estimates of efficiency. This combination results in a relative “best 
practice” approximation of the efficiency that is cautious (Kuosmanen, 2001b). A 
popular understanding of the above is that DEA estimates the underlying 
technology so as to present the DMUs ‘in the best possible light’ (Bogetoft & 
Otto, 2010). In other words, the DEA profiling approach will provide each 
physician with the highest efficiency level possible given the efficiency levels 
achieved by other physicians profiled.  
The minimal extrapolation principle in DEA is not, however, a given. It depends 
on the production assumptions imposed when estimating the underlying 
technology. It is, therefore, essential to show that the minimal extrapolation 
principle holds when applying DEA to physician profiling. Banker et al. (1984) 
and Bogetoft and Otto (2010) rigorously prove that the minimum extrapolation 
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principle always holds if it is appropriate to assume that the technology exhibits 
free disposability, convexity and standard return-to-scale properties (these are 
discussed in detail below). The appropriateness of these production assumptions 
(and, therefore, the minimum extrapolation principle) is discussed in the 
Section 6.6.  
5.3.2 Production assumptions 
Different DEA models are distinguished by the set of production assumptions 
imposed on the technology set. The essential assumptions applicable to classic 
DEA models are: non-negativity, weak essentiality, free disposability, convexity, 
and return-to-scale properties (Agrell & Bogetoft, 2001; Bogetoft & Otto, 2010; 
Coelli et al., 2005). It should be noted that all these assumptions are considered 
‘weak’ in the sense that they are most often fulfilled in practice and they contain 
limited power in extending the technology set (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). 
Non-negativity states that the level of the inputs and outputs are finite, non-
negative, real numbers (Coelli et al., 2005). This assumption does allow for the 
level of inputs and outputs to be zero. This means that efficiency is assessed in the 
positive quadrant of the input-output plane illustrated in Figure 5.1. There are 
DEA models that allow for negative values of inputs and outputs, but these are not 
considered in this study. Weak essentiality ensures that the production of a 
positive output is impossible without the use of at least one input (Coelli et al., 
2005). Put another way, if all the input quantities are zero then the output is zero 
(represented as the point of origin in Figure 2). 
Free disposability of inputs states that if a certain quantity of outputs can be 
produced with a given quantity of inputs, then the same quantity of outputs can be 
produced with more inputs (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). In other words, surplus 
inputs can be freely disposed of. Free disposability of outputs states that if a given 
quantity of inputs can produce a given quantity of outputs, then the same input 
level can also be used to produce less outputs (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). In other 
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words, surplus output can be freely disposed of. Essentially, free disposability 
ensures that an increase in inputs will yield the same or higher level of outputs 
(Coelli et al., 2005).  
Convexity states that if two input-output combinations are feasible then all 
weighted averages (convex combinations) of the two are also feasible levels of 
production (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). This allows for the interpolation of the 
efficiency scores of observed DMUs. In so doing, efficiency scores can be 
determined for hypothetical DMUs lying between the observed DMUs. Convexity 
thereby extends the technology, which in turn enables us to rely on fewer 
observations and still attain credible results (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010).  Illustrated 
graphically using Figure 5.1, convexity allows the comparison of, for example, 
the inefficient DMU A to the efficient hypothetical DMU A*; the convex 
combination of efficient DMUs B and C. The convexity assumption therefore 
allows for the completion of the ‘DEA frontier’ by filling in the gaps between the 
observed efficient DMUs. 
Free disposability and convexity hold only if inputs and outputs are divisible and 
not subject to congestion (Kuosmanen, 2001a). Inputs and outputs are divisible if 
they need not be integers. For example, commodities and monetary amounts are 
easily divisible while inputs or outputs like the number of employees are not 
(Kuosmanen, 2001a). Without divisibility the interpolation and extrapolation of 
inputs and outputs required for the convexity assumption to hold, is not possible. 
Cooper et al. (2011b, p. 174) explain that “congestion is said to occur when the 
output that is maximally possible can be increased by reducing one or more inputs 
without increasing any other input or decreasing any other output. Conversely, 
congestion is said to occur when some of the outputs that are maximally possible 
are reduced by increasing one or more inputs without reducing any other input or 
increasing any other output”. Cooper et al. (2011b) give an example of a coalmine 
that analyses its efficiency using a 1-input 1-output DEA model. The input is the 
number of miners and the output is the quantity of coal produced. Therefore, 
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producing more coal with fewer miners increases efficiency. The coalmine is 
subject to congestion if increasing the number of miners makes it possible to form 
‘teams’ to perform tasks at a level of efficiency that is impossible to achieve with 
a smaller number of miners. Therefore, the highest possible rate of coal 
production per miner is achieved by increasing the number of miners. The above 
example illuminates how congestion violates the assumption of free disposability. 
In addition, economies of scale and scope as well as reduced prices from buying 
in bulk violate the convexity assumption (Kuosmanen, 2001b).  
The return to scale assumptions refers to whether rescaling is possible in order to 
increase efficiency (Ozcan, 2008). Returns to scale properties determine the link 
between technical and scale efficiency discussed in Section 3.2. As previously 
discussed, a DMU may be technically efficient but potentially able to achieve 
increased efficiency by augmenting the scale of its operations. The return to scale 
property chosen determines whether it is assumed that rescaling is actually 
achievable by the DMU in order to increase efficiency (Banker et al., 1984). In 
other words, a DMU should be deemed inefficient if it is a priori assumed that it 
could operate at the optimal scale but it is not currently doing so. 
Different assumptions can be made regarding the extent and nature of possible 
rescaling. The weakest assumption is variable returns to scale (VRS), which 
assumes that no rescaling is possible. In other words, the model considers only the 
level of efficiency or inefficiency at the given level of operations for each DMU. 
This means that the scale of a DMU’s production has no bearing on its determined 
efficiency score. The strongest assumption is constant returns to scale (CRS) 
which allows any possible production combination to be arbitrarily scaled up or 
down to allow a DMU to operate at its optimal scale (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010; 
Ozcan, 2008). This means that the scale of a DMU’s production does affect its 
efficiency score since its efficiency is being measured relative to a ‘best-practice’ 
frontier of DMUs operating at their optimal scale. In between, there exist 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) and increasing returns to scale (IRS). DRS 
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assumes decreasing the scale of operations may achieve increased efficiency but 
increasing the scale will not and may result in a reduction in the level of 
efficiency (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010; Ozcan, 2008). Conversely, IRS assumes 
increasing the scale of operations may achieve increased efficiency but decreasing 
the scale will not and may result in a reduction in the level of efficiency (Bogetoft 
& Otto, 2010; Ozcan, 2008). Practical reasons for this are that a larger scale of 
operations may imply more experience, more efficient processes and a better 
ability to utilize specialisation opportunities (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). 
To conclude this subsection, Kuosmanen (2001b, p. 10) advises “thinking in terms 
of the efficiency frontier when considering the production assumptions. Free 
disposability can be viewed as a first-order curvature condition, convexity can be 
seen as a second-order curvature condition, while returns to scale properties can 
be thought of as homogeneity conditions”. In addition, it is important to reiterate 
that the production assumptions refer solely to the assumptions concerning the 
properties of the underlying technology set. There will be additional (explicit and 
implicit) assumptions made regarding the other two parts of the DEA evaluation 
process (Kuosmanen, 2001b). For example, as mentioned in the introduction to 
this section, it is assumed that the production process does not involve stochastic 
variations, the data are error-free, as well as the various assumptions relating to 
properties of the inputs and outputs, discussed in Section 5.2.2.  
5.4 Measuring efficiency 
Once the production assumptions are made and the resulting technology is 
defined, the final consideration is the method by which the relative efficiency of 
the DMUs is to be measured. There are two possible methods. The first is known 
as the ‘CCR ratio efficiency measure’ which was proposed in the seminal work on 
DEA by Charnes et al. (1978). This method stems from the generalisation of 
simple ratio analysis where a single output to input ratio is used to compare the 
productivity of DMUs (Cook & Zhu, 2006; Sherman & Zhu, 2006). Charnes et al. 
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(1978) also developed the second method known as the ‘dual efficiency measure’. 
This was done by, first, transforming the CCR ratio measure into a linear 
programming (LP) problem (Cooper et al., 2011b). Second, the associated dual of 
the LP problem was determined; providing the dual efficiency measure (Coelli et 
al., 2005). The dual efficiency measure arises due to the duality theorem; which 
states that every LP problem can be converted into a dual problem providing an 
upper bound to its optimal value (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2009). The dual 
efficiency measure is often also referred to as the ‘Farrell efficiency 
measure’(Cooper et al., 2011b). It should be noted that the dual theorem ensures 
that both the above methods reach the same efficiency scores of the DMUs (Coelli 
et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2011b). More rigorous explanations of the above DEA 
efficiency measures are discussed in the sub-sections that follow. The reasons for 
a particular method over the other are also highlighted.  
A further important consideration when measuring efficiency, using either of the 
methods discussed above, is whether efficiency is measured from an input- or 
output-orientated perspective. In an input-orientation model, one improves 
efficiency through proportional reduction of inputs, whereas an output orientation 
model requires proportional augmentation of outputs (Cooper et al., 2011b; 
Ozcan, 2008).  The choice of whether to use an input-orientated model as opposed 
to an output-orientated model depends on whether the input quantities are the 
primary decision variables. If this is the case, the DMU has control over the inputs 
used in production, as it attempts to minimise the combination of inputs used to 
produce the observed level of outputs. As such, an input-orientated model is used. 
If the DMUs are given a fixed quantity of resources (inputs) and with these 
attempt to maximise the level of outputs, then an output-orientated model will be 
used (Coelli et al., 2005). Essentially, the orientation is chosen according to which 
quantities (input or outputs) the DMUs have most control over. Coelli et al. (2005, 
p. 181) make the important point that “the output- and input- orientated DEA 
models estimate exactly the same frontier and therefore, by definition, identify the 
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same set of firms as being efficient. It is only the efficiency measures associated 
with inefficient firms that may differ between the two methods”.  
The remainder of Section 5 describes the classic models that emerge from 
combining the three parts of the DEA evaluation process. The descriptions of the 
classic DEA model that follows comprise both the mathematical development of 
the model as well as an explanation of the rationale behind the mathematical 
formulations. All the DEA models below are described from an input-orientated 
perspective. The mathematics and rationale of the output-orientated DEA models 
are, however, largely similar. It is important to reiterate that these DEA models 
are differentiated by the production assumptions used to estimate the unknown 
technology set as well as the method of measuring efficiency. Where it is not 
explicit in the description of the DEA models below, the production assumptions 
made are stated in parentheses. 
5.5 CCR model 
The Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) model is the initial DEA model 
developed on the work done by Farrell (1957). Both the ‘CCR multiplier model’ 
and the ‘CCR dual model’ are discussed below.  
For explanatory purposes, it is assumed that there are n DMUs being analysed. It 
is also assumed that each DMU consumes varying amounts of m different inputs 
to produce s different outputs, and all DMUs have equal access to all the m inputs. 
An individual DMUj consumes amount xij of input i and produces amount yrj of 
output r (Cooper et al., 2011b). Each DMUj , therefore, exhibits the production 
process illustrated in Figure 4.1, where j=1,2,…,n . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that xij ≥ 0 and yrj ≥ 0 (non-negativity) and that each 
DMU has at least one positive input and one positive output value (weak 
essentiality). Throughout the descriptions of the DEA models below, the DMU 
under consideration is referred to as DMUo (Cooper et al., 2011b).  
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5.5.1 CCR multiplier model  
The derivation of the CCR multiplier model begins by considering a version of 
the model referred to as the ‘CCR ratio model’. The ratio form evaluates 
efficiency using the CCR ratio measure discussed in Section 5.4. This definition 
measures the efficiency of a DMU “as a maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs 
to weighted inputs subject to the condition that the similar ratios for every DMU 
be less than or equal to unity” (Charnes et al., 1978, p. 430) . Therefore, the CCR 
ratio measure of efficiency maximises the ratio of the outputs to inputs of DMUo. 
This is then evaluated against the input-output ratios of all the other DMUs being 
analysed (Cooper et al., 2011b).  In so doing, the CCR ratio model determines the 
optimal relative efficiency between DMUo and DMUj where j=1,2,…,n  (basic 
determinism postulate). This model assumes CRS and thus inputs and outputs can 
arbitrarily be rescaled up or down to achieve optimal scale of production (Cook & 
Zhu, 2006). The above can be expressed formally as follows:  
 















 ≤ 1   for j = 1, … , n         (2) 
𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑟  ≥ 0  for all 𝑖 and 𝑟                     (3)                   
 
where the variables to be determined are the br’s and ai’s which are the weights 
assigned to the yro’s and xio’s; the observed output and input levels respectively of 
DMUo. These weights can be thought of as an expression of the relative 
importance of the specific inputs and outputs (Cook & Zhu, 2006). The solution 
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of the above set of equations in a set of optimal weights (a*, b*) that maximise 
ho(a, b), and thereby allows the calculation of efficiency score ho(a*, b*) for 
DMUo. This is done separately for each DMUj to provide a set n of optimal 
weights and n respective efficiency scores.   
In equation (1) the numerator is essentially reducing the multiple outputs into a 
single “virtual output” that is calculated as the weighted linear combination of the 
s outputs. The denominator does the same to the m inputs (Sherman & Zhu, 
2006). Each time an efficiency ratio is determined, the weights are recalculated so 
as to maximise the CCR efficiency score of that DMUo and thus give that DMU 
the highest efficiency score possible (Coelli et al., 2005). As such, each DMUj is 
considered in the “best” light relative to its peers. An optimal efficiency score is, 
thus, determined for each observed DMU, and each is assigned a set of weights 
that is most favourable to them (i.e. the combination of the basic determinism 
postulate and minimal extrapolation principal) (Coelli et al., 2005). As a result, 
DEA provides a conservative measure of efficiency (discussed in Section 5.3.1). It 
can also be observed from equation (1) that DEA determines the weights from the 
data and does not require an a priori set of weights for each input and output. 
Therefore, DEA reduces complexity by attempting to keep a priori assumptions to 
a minimum (Cook & Zhu, 2006). 
Inequalities (2) and (3) apply a set of normalising constraints (three for each 
DMU) to the efficiency ratio being determined. This set of constraints provides a 
reference as to what will be the highest and lowest efficiency scores achievable. 
By constraining the ratio of all the DMUs to be less than one, the highest 
attainable efficiency score is one (Cooper et al., 2011b). Therefore, if a DMU 
attains an efficiency score of one it cannot improve its efficiency relative to its 
peers. The DMUs with an efficiency score of one thus make up the efficiency 
frontier. Constraining the weights to be greater than zero ensures that the 
minimum relative efficiency score possible is zero (Cooper et al., 2011b). All 
DMUs with an efficiency score between zero and one are relatively inefficient and 
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sit in the technology set within the efficiency frontier (illustrated graphically in 
Figure 5.1).  
The problem with the CCR ratio model above is that there are an infinite number 
of possible sets of solutions for the optimal weights that can be used to calculate 
the efficiency score h0(a*, b*) (Coelli et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2011b). This is 
because if (a*, b*) is optimal then so is (ϕa*, ϕb*) for all ϕ > 0. In order to resolve 
this problem Charnes and Cooper (1962) developed a transformation converting 
the ratio form into a linear program that selects a solution for (a, b) such that 
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖 = 1 (Cooper et al., 2011b). This transformation ensures that a single set 
of optimal weights (a*, b*) is determined for ho(a*, b*). Formally, the “Charnes-
Cooper” transformation applied to the weights are: 
 





  for j = 1, … , n 





  for j = 1, … , n 
 
This transformation turns the CCR ratio model into an LP problem, deriving the 
CCR multiplier model, expressed formally as: 
 








−  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1







𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑟  ≥ 0 
where the βr’s and αi’s are now the variables of interest and due to them being 
transformed, are now referred to as ‘multipliers’ as opposed to weights. The 
model aims to determine the single optimal set of multipliers (α*, β*) with their 
respective efficiency score z*. This is repeated for each of the n DMUs. As in the 
CCR ratio model, DMUs obtaining an efficiency score of one make up the frontier 
and the DMUs between zero and one fall in the technology set within the frontier 
(Figure 5.1).  
5.5.2 CCR dual model 
The LP problem above can now be transformed into its dual form (as discussed in 
Section 5.4). The CCR dual model is also commonly known as the ‘envelopment 
model’ or the ‘Farrell model’ (Cooper et al., 2011b). Formally, the dual model is 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝜃∗ = min 𝜃 
subject to: 












where the variables of interest are the weights (λj) and (θ). An advantage of the 
dual model is that it involves fewer constraints than the multiplier model. This 
means less computing time, and thus the dual model is generally preferred (Coelli 
et al., 2005). This model, like the multiplier model, assumes CRS. It is important 
to reiterate that by virtue of the dual theorem of LP problems, the efficiency score 
determined under the dual model θ* equals z*; the efficiency score determined 
under the multiplier model. Hence, the model may be used interchangeably 
(Cooper et al., 2011b). 
Another advantage of the dual model is that it has a more intuitive interpretation 
(Coelli et al., 2005). The right hand side of inequality (5) attempts to 
proportionally reduce the level of inputs of DMUo by the amount θ, while the left 
hand side of inequalities (5) and (6) ensure that the resultant reduced input level is 
still within the feasible input and output sets defined by the technology (Bogetoft 
& Otto, 2010).  In other words, with reference to the input and output levels of the 
other DMUs, by what proportion θ can the inputs of DMUo be reduced in order to 
increase its efficiency. If that proportion is equal to one then it is not possible for 
the DMU to operate more efficiently than it currently is (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). 
Here θ is minimised in order to cast each DMU in the ‘best’ possible light, as in 
the multiplier model. Again in keeping with the multiplier model, all relatively 
efficient DMUs have a θ* equal to one and these DMUs make up the efficiency 
frontier. All relatively inefficient firms will have 0 < θ*< 1 and fall in the 
technology set within the efficiency frontier (Figure 5.1). For all inefficient 
DMUs, θ* represents the proportional decrease in inputs they need to achieve in 
order to be considered relatively efficient (Coelli et al., 2005).  
The key advantage of the dual model is that for all relatively inefficient DMUs, 
the left hand side of inequality (5) produces a weighted average of efficient 
DMU’s input levels that are used to determine the efficiency score, θ* (convexity) 
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(Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). Through this process the dual model not only determines 
a measure of relative efficiency for each DMU, but also determines the DMU’s 
‘efficiency reference set’ (ERS) also known as ‘peer units’ or just ‘peers’ (Coelli 
et al., 2005). Bogetoft and Otto (2010) explain that the left-hand side of 
inequalities (5) and (6) define the ‘reference unit’ against which DMUo is 
compared. The reference unit is a convex combination of efficient DMUs with 
weights λj representing the projection onto the efficient frontier. The set of 
efficient DMUs that combine to make up the ‘reference unit’ are DMUo’s peers. 
Intuitively, the peers are the perceived efficient DMUs against which an 
inefficient DMU is most clearly determined to be inefficient (Coelli et al., 2005). 
They can also be thought of as the set of efficient DMUs from which an 
inefficient DMU’s level of inefficiency has been determined. The individual 
weights λj can then be thought of as ranking the individual peers themselves 
(Cooper et al., 2011b). The bigger the value of λj associated with a particular peer, 
the greater its individual influence in determining the inefficient DMU’s score θ* 
(Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). 
5.5.3 CCR dual model with slacks 
It is necessary to consider the concept of slacks and the resultant difference 
between ‘DEA efficiency’ and ‘weakly DEA efficient’ (Cooper et al., 2011b, p. 
10). As mentioned earlier, the models considered here are input-orientated and 
thus are projected onto the efficiency frontier through a proportional reduction in 
inputs. However, it is common in many DEA models that a DMU is projected 
onto the vertical or horizontal parts of the efficiency frontier (see the ‘DEA 
frontier’ in Figure 5.1) (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). In these cases, even after the 
proportional reduction in inputs, efficiency can still be improved by a further 
deterministic reduction in one or more inputs, or a deterministic augmentation of 
one or more outputs. Ozcan (2008, p. 29) explains that “slacks exist only for those 
DMUs identified as inefficient. However, slacks represent only the leftover 
portions of inefficiencies; after proportional reductions in inputs or outputs, if a 
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DMU cannot reach the optimal point on the efficiency frontier, slacks are needed 
to push the DMU to the this point on the frontier”. 
In order to determine the slacks in a DEA analysis, a second-stage LP problem is 
required to be solved subsequent to determining the efficiency scores using the 
dual model (Cook & Zhu, 2006). Thus, if an input-orientated dual model is used 
as the first-stage linear program, the corresponding second-stage linear program 












∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝜆𝑗 + 𝑠𝑖




∑ 𝑦𝑟𝑗𝜆𝑗 + 𝑠𝑟






+ ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑟 
 
where the variables of interest are si
- and sr
+, representing the input and output 
slacks respectively.  
This leads to the differentiation of DEA efficiency and weakly DEA efficient. 
Cooper et al. (2011b, p. 10) state that the performance of DMUo is “DEA efficient 
if and only if (1) θ* = 1, and (2) all slacks si
-* = sr
+* = 0”. The performance of 
DMUo is “weakly DEA efficient if and only if both (1) θ* = 1, and (2) si
-* ≠ 0 
and/or sr
+* ≠ 0 for some i or r in some alternate optima”.  
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5.6 BCC model 
The BCC model was first proposed by Banker et al. (1984) and added an 
additional constraint to the sum of the weights (λj) in the CCR dual model in order 
to alter the return to scale properties from CRS to one of VRS, DRS or IRS. 
Formally, the options of the constraints that can be added to the dual model 
weights are: 
 
𝐴𝑑𝑑     ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
= 1     𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑉𝑅𝑆 
𝐴𝑑𝑑     ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
≤ 1     𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑅𝑆 
𝐴𝑑𝑑     ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
≥ 1     𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑅𝑆 
 
The result of added constraint is that the CRS assumption is deleted and instead 
the DEA model assumes VRS, DRS or IRS. The returns-to-scale property of 
interest in this study is VRS; the weakest returns-to-scale assumption. If the 
model exhibits VRS then it no longer allows any rescaling of inputs and outputs. 
Banker et al. (1984, p. 1084) elaborate that the CRS assumption “enables 
extrapolation of the performance of the most efficient DMUs (i.e. allows rescaling 
with efficient scale sizes for their given input and output mixes) and identify any 
scale inefficiencies that may be reflected in the level of operations of other 
DMUs”. The VRS assumption, on the other hand, “restricts attention strictly to 
production inefficiencies at the given level of operations for each DMU (i.e. no 
rescaling allowed), and thus develop an efficiency measurement procedure that 
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assigns an efficiency rating of one to a DMU if and only if the DMU lies on the 
efficient production surface, even when it may not be operating at the most 





This section describes the method followed in adapting DEA for the purpose of 
profiling physician performance. This is done by addressing, in turn, the three 
parts involved in evaluating efficiency using DEA (discussed in Section 5). 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of five prominent international DEA profiling 
studies. Decisions regarding the nature of inputs and outputs included in the DEA 
profiling methodology below are justified with reference to these studies.  
6.1 Setting the profiling objectives and defining efficiency 
Medscheme, South Africa’s largest medical scheme administrator, provided the 
data used in this study. The reason for their generosity reflects their interest in 
improving the managed-care services they provide to their client medical 
schemes. Exploring new profiling methods (such as DEA) may provide 
Medscheme the ability to more effectively evaluate physician performance on the 
part of their clients. Therefore, even though this study makes use of data provided 
by a third-party administrator, profiling is still performed from a medical 
scheme’s perspective.  
The methodology began with an in-depth discussion with a Medscheme employee 
in order to gauge key profiling objectives from a funder’s perspective. It is 
important to frame the profiling objectives from the funder perspective and not 
from the physician perspective. If physicians’ were attempting to determine the 
efficiency of their own practices then the performance issues of concern would be, 
for example, the cost of their labour in treating their patients, the cost and quantity 
of materials used, their capital expenditure on tools and appliances, the rent cost 
of their consultation room; among others (Coelli et al., 2005). The funder, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the quality and utilisation rate of the healthcare 
services that they reimburse for the treatment of patients.  
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  Table 6.1     Summary of prominent international studies evaluating physician 
performance using DEA  




15 cardiac surgeons 
Cost of: 
 Hospital services 
 Ancillary services 
Number of: 
 High severity 
discharges 








 Hospital services 
 Ancillary services 
Number of: 
 High severity 
discharges 








 Hospital days used 
 Ambulatory units 
 Office visits 
 Referrals to sub-
specialists 
 Mental health visits 
 Therapy units 
 Tests 
 Emergency room 
visits 
Number of: 
 Infants and children 
 Females 20 – 39 
 Males 20 – 39 
 Females 40 – 59 
 Males 40 – 59 
 Females 60+  





 GP services 
 Specialist services 





 Low severity otitis 
media patients 
 Medium severity 
otitis media patients 
 High severity otitis 
media patients 






 Visits to the 
attending physician 
 Referrals by the 
attending physician  
 Emergency room 
visits  
 Prescriptions  
 Laboratory tests 
Number of: 
 Low severity sinusitis 
patients  
 Medium severity 
sinusitis patients 





A decision is, therefore, required on the criteria upon which physicians’ 
performance is to be based; healthcare resource utilisation, quality of care, or a 
combination of both. This forms the starting point in determining how physicians’ 
relative efficiency is defined in this study. The decision is made that physicians’ 
performance is to be assessed solely on their relative efficiency in utilising 
healthcare resources to treat their patients. The reason for this reflects the desire to 
avoid the complications surrounding the inclusion of quality measures (discussed 
in Section 5.2). Performance evaluation reflecting quality of care is, therefore, left 
as future research. By excluding quality measures from the analysis it is assumed 
that the quality provided by each profiled physician is constant. This is a very 
strong assumption and its implications on the interpretation of results are 
discussed in the Sections 8. 
Two separate approaches can be used to assess the efficiency of physicians’ 
resource utilisation. First, resource efficiency can be based on the quantity of 
resources utilised by physicians to treat their patients. Table 6.1 illustrates that this 
approach was taken by Chilingerian and Sherman (1997) and Ozcan et al. (2000).  
When this approach is used, physicians’ profiles reflect exclusively their technical 
efficiency (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). Alternatively, resource efficiency can be 
based on the reimbursement cost to funders of the resources used by physicians. 
Table 6.1 illustrates that this approach is taken by Chilingerian and Sherman 
(1990; 1995) and Ozcan (1998).  Performance based on cost of resources utilised 
reflects the combination of physicians’ technical and price efficiency (Ozcan, 
2008). In other words, physicians’ efficiency is based on their ability to both 
utilise the least inputs to produce outputs, and to source the cheapest inputs to 
produce outputs (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). It is decided, based on the discussion 
with Medscheme, that it is more meaningful from a funder’s perspective to base 
performance on the reimbursement costs incurred. The key advantage justifying 
this approach is that it allows efficiency improvements to be quantified in 
monetary terms (Chilingerian, 1995). The disadvantage is that the profiling results 
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will not reflect the extent to which physicians’ inefficiency is a result of being 
technical as opposed to price inefficient (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). This is due to 
the complicated nature of price efficiency (discussed in Section 4.2.4).  
In addition, it is decided that the DEA analysis is undertaken on a practice level 
(as discussed in Section 5.2.4). The reason for this is that it is deemed to better 
investigate the research question of focus in this study; the use of DEA to measure 
the overall resource efficiency of physician practices. Consequently, it is 
important to highlight the complications of performing practice-level analyses on 
the methodology. This is detailed in Section 6.5.1 below. 
Therefore, the profiling process in this study compares the relative performance of 
physicians based on their price and technical efficiency of healthcare resource 
utilisation. 
6.2 Conceptualising the production transformation process  
When conceptualising a physician’s production transformation process, 
Chilingerian and Sherman (1990, p. 4) advises picturing the physician as “the 
general manager of a temporary firm that exists each and every time he/she treats 
a patient”. The inputs of the temporary firm are the healthcare services used by 
the physician to treat patients. The production output is the physician’s entire 
patient population over a given period (Chilingerian & Sherman, 1990). The 
conceptualisation of the production process differs, however, between GPs and 
specialists. Specialist profiling involves comparing the efficiency in which a 





No. of patients 
treated 
Figure 6.1    Illustration of specialist physician production transformation process 
Total healthcare 
services utilised 





Profiling the performance of GPs, on the other hand, is not only determined by 
their healthcare resources efficiency but also by the ‘downstream costs’ that the 
GP generates (Chilingerian and Sherman, 1997). The GP generates downstream 
costs when they are unable to fully treat their patients; and thus have to refer 
patients on to tertiary care provided by specialists. GPs’ production process must, 
therefore, reflect that they are responsible for both the cost of healthcare services 
they themselves incurred in the treatment of patients, as well as the downstream 
costs that they generate (Figure 6.2). The above is illustrated in all three GP-
profiling studies featured in Table 6.1. Chilingerian and Sherman (1997) and 
Ozcan et al. (2000) both include the number of referrals as an input. Ozcan (1998) 









Incorporating downstream costs into a GP profiling process can be complicated. A 
patient may not always visit the same GP and may seek the opinion of multiple 
GPs before undergoing tertiary care. The patient may also bypass the GP 
consultation altogether and go straight to a specialist. Consequently, it is difficult 
to attribute downstream costs to a particular GP (Thomas et al., 2004). The 














Figure 6.2    Illustration of GP production transformation process 
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role of ‘gatekeepers’ (Thomas et al., 2004). This is where all patients are assigned 
a specific GP, who represents the patient's first contact with the healthcare system. 
The GP has the sole responsibility to triage patient's further access to the 
healthcare system (Loudon, 2008). The GP manages their patient’s healthcare 
services by coordinating referrals, and screening out unnecessary services. All 
downstream costs can, therefore, be confidently attributed to a particular GP. In 
the South African private healthcare sector, however, GPs do not act as 
gatekeepers (McIntrye, 2010).  
6.3 Choice of physician type 
Physician profiling techniques are performed separately on the different types of 
physicians providing healthcare services. The reasons for this are discussed in 
Section 5.2.1. It is decided that the DEA profiling approach will be applied 
exclusively to a specialist type in order to avoid the complications surrounding GP 
profiling in a ‘non-gatekeeper’ environment. Figure 6.1, therefore, represents the 
production process applicable to this study. In addition, it is decided that, due to 
time constraints in this study, only one specialist type will be profiled. There are, 
however, a large number of specialities operating in the South African healthcare 
system. A decision thus needs to be made regarding which speciality to profile. 
The choice of speciality needs to be such that the two key requirements of all 
profiling methods are met (discussed in Section 3.3). First, it must be possible to 
perform adequate case-mix adjustment on the patient population treated by the 
chosen physicians. Second, the profiling process needs to exhibit adequate 
reliability. This requires that there be a sufficient number of physicians of the type 
chosen and these physicians need to have treated a sufficient number of patients. 
Consequently, both of these requirements depend on the data available. The steps 
followed to achieve these two requirements are discussed in detail below in 
Sections 6.4.1 & 6.5.1 respectively.  
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Further discussions with Medscheme were held to discuss which specialities best 
meet the two profiling requirements stated. Medscheme provides administrative 
and managed care services to (and thus has data on) 18 medical schemes. Many 
speciality types, therefore, meet the requirement of having a sufficient 
participation of practicing specialists treating a sufficient number of patients. 
Focus turned to rather identifying which speciality could most effectively and 
easily be adjusted for differences in case-mix.  
The initial intention was to choose the speciality that treated the most 
homogenous population of patients with respect to their demographic 
characteristics, current state of health as well as type and severity of condition 
being treated. Then only basic risk adjustment would need to be applied to 
homogenise the resource utilisation of specialists’ populations of patients. 
Unfortunately, even though some specialities are potentially believed to possess a 
more homogenous case-mix than others it is very difficult to determine this with 
any degree of certainty.  
Consequently, each speciality was individually considered to determine which one 
most readily allowed for effective and straightforward case-mix adjustment. The 
speciality type that stood out was general/ paediatric surgeons. The reason for this 
is that the majority of patients seen by surgeons involve admission to hospital and 
all hospital admissions are classified into a ‘diagnosis-related group’ (DRG). 
Further details regarding DRGs and their use in this investigation for the purpose 
of case-mix adjustment is discussed in Section 6.5.1 below. Most other 
specialities treat a large percentage of their patients in private consultation rooms. 
DRGs are not allocated to procedures performed outside of hospital. Choosing to 
profile general/ paediatric surgeons, therefore, provided the necessary DRG data, 
making it particularly suited to effective case-mix adjustment that is 
straightforward to carry out.  
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Even though the general/ paediatric surgery is deemed to most suitable speciality 
type, there are complications posed by this speciality type. These are discussed in 
Section 6.5.1 below. 
6.4 Data  
As stated above, DRG case-mix adjustment can only be applied to hospital 
admissions.  To ensure that a DRG could be assigned to all the surgeons’ patients, 
only healthcare services provided to patients admitted to hospital are included in 
the profiling process. Stated another way, this study profiles the in-hospital 
services provided by general/ paediatric surgeons. It should be noted that the term 
‘in-hospital’ reflects healthcare services directly related to a hospital admission 
and not the healthcare facility in which services are provided. Therefore, even 
though the majority of healthcare services utilised by surgeons are provided in 
private hospital facilities (e.g. surgery, hospital, anaesthetist, radiology etc.), some  
may have been provided elsewhere (e.g. pathology and physiotherapy).  
Medscheme provided in-hospital data on 504 surgeons treating 81 934 patients in 
2012. The data was provided at the beginning of February 2014 and, at that time, 
the 2012 calendar year was the most current year where full data was available. 
This is because the 2013 data was not fully run-off7 and, therefore, approximately 
three months of 2013 data was not available. The raw data on patients’ in-hospital 
events was provided in the form of claim-line data. This data showed, for each 
event, the description and amount of all healthcare services claimed for 
reimbursement. In addition, the DRGs assigned to each in-hospital event were 
provided. Demographic information was also provided on all the patients.  
                                                          
7 Claims occurring in a particular year may not be settled by a medical scheme in that 
year. In addition, claims may not even be reported to the medical scheme by the patient in 
that year (Bornhuetter & Ferguson, 1972). As a result, claims data will only be complete 




The above three data sets were then condensed into summary data for each in-
hospital event. The summary data shows, for each event, the demographic 
information, DRG and aggregated cost of each of the healthcare services claimed 
for. The summary data was produced using the data analytics software, Microsoft 
Access 2007. For samples of the raw and summary data refer to Appendix A. 
Medscheme reimbursed 38 categories of in-hospital healthcare service utilised by 
surgeons in the treatment of their patients (Appendix B).  
Medscheme runs an algorithm to determine how a surgeon is attributed 
responsibility for a particular patient’s in-hospital event. The details of this 
algorithm were not, however, shared by Medscheme. It should be noted that this 
attribution algorithm was relied on and assumed accurate in this study. The 
summary data for each event was, thereby, assigned to the particular surgeon 
deemed responsible for that event. The total number of events assigned to a 
particular surgeon represents the number patients treated by that surgeon in 2012. 
This is thus the method followed to obtain the pre-case-mix adjusted output used 
in the profiling process. In discussions that follow, the surgeons’ output is 
sometimes expressed as the number of ‘patients’ treated. A more accurate 
description is the number of ‘hospital admissions’ treated. This is because a 
patient could have multiple admissions during the study period and this analysis 
does not aggregate multiple admissions per patient. 
It is important to note that some of the surgeons’ practices may have multiple 
surgeons claiming using the same practice identification number. Complicating 
this is that sometimes they specialise in different types of surgery. These data 
were not available, but this limitation is not believed to be significant as group 
practices are not the norm in South Africa. In any case, this is a confounding 
factor that is very difficult to allow for and additional data are necessary to 




6.4.1 The use of claims data 
The above illustrates that profiling in this study uses ‘claims data’. This is detailed 
data on the healthcare services submitted for reimbursement from the funder 
(Ferver, Burton, & Jesilow, 2009). It is noted that not all claims will necessarily 
lead to reimbursement by the funder. This occurs where certain healthcare 
services do not form part of the cover provided by the funder. Claims data, 
therefore, represent the cost to the patient of healthcare services utilised in their 
treatment by the physician. The cost to the funder of patients’ treatment may, 
however, be less.  Claims data are used as opposed to ‘micro-data’; data collected 
specifically for the profiling process, such as individual medical records and 
surveys of physician practices (Ferver et al., 2009).  
The reasons for using claims data are the same as those described by McNeil, 
Pedersen, and Gatsonis (1992, p. 300),  that “large claims databases exists and are 
relatively inexpensive to use. Moreover, they support unobtrusive data collection, 
support episode-of-illness analysis, and facilitate the longitudinal surveillance of 
selected patient cohorts”. Furthermore, claims data are available in electronic 
format, good for establishing the cost for certain diagnoses, and avoid the 
common problem with surveys that individuals may not accurately self-report 
(Ferver et al., 2009). 
The advantage of note is that claims databases provide access to a large volume of 
clinical data. As discussed above in Section 6.3, in order to ensure statistical 
reliability profiling requires a large sample size of physicians and for the 
individual physicians to have seen enough patients (Lasker et al., 1992; McNeil et 
al., 1992). The consequence of low reliability is that it cannot be discerned 
whether the measure of physicians’ performance is that result of true variation in 
efficiency or just random chance (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 2013). There are two 
explanations as to why this is the case. First, the performance of a physician can 
be unduly affected by a small number of high-resource use patients. This of 
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particular effect since case-mix adjustment may not be able to fully allow for 
extreme-outlier-high-resource patients (McNeil et al., 1992). Second, if a 
physician sees too few patients it will be difficult to show a significant 
performance difference between providers, considering that a very small 
performance difference in either direction will be seen as significant (Luft & 
Hunt, 1986).  Therefore, the use of claims data provides an effective method of 
achieving the necessary volume of data required to effectively profile the 
performance of physicians.  
In spite of providing access to large volumes of data, claims data will represent 
only a percentage of each physician’s caseload. This is because data is usually 
only available from a percentage funders providing healthcare financing to only a 
fraction of the market. In this study, Medscheme provides data on the 18 medical 
schemes to which they provide services. As such, the data only includes claims 
information on the patients covered by those medical schemes. Surgeons may 
have treated many other patients who are covered by other schemes or that paid 
for treatment out of pocket. Therefore, the profiling process is an analysis of the 
surgeons’ efficiency in treating beneficiaries of these 18 schemes. The results 
cannot be interpreted as surgeons’ efficiency in treating all their patients. 
Furthermore, efficiency is only measured relative to surgeons that treated 
beneficiaries of these schemes. Surgeons that exclusively treated beneficiaries of 
other South African medical schemes and/or patients that paid out of pocket are 
not included in the profiling process. 
A further issue with using claims databases is that they are designed to support 
patient billing and not for use in physician profiling investigations (Ferver et al., 
2009). As a result, claims databases are often missing and/or distort pertinent data 
necessary for effective profiling. McNeil et al. (1992) provide a number of 
examples, including incomplete utilisation data, inaccurate physician identifier 
information and incomplete clinical detail. Incomplete utilisation data is clearly 
not conducive to comprehensive measurements of physician performance based 
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on their efficiency of resource utilisation. This issue was discussed with 
Medscheme. They assured that this is not a significant issue in the data provided 
due to comprehensive billing practices by hospitals and specialists. The lack of 
physician identifier information gives rise to attribution problems. This is where 
more than one physician is involved in the treatment of a patient and it is difficult 
to determine from the claims data which physician, for example, ordered a 
particular procedure, prescribed a particular drug or admitted the patient to 
hospital (Thomas et al., 2004). As discussed in Section 6.2, this is a frequent 
barrier to the effective profiling of GPs. The outcome of the lack of identifier 
information is that effective profiling of GPs is often limited to ‘gatekeeper’ 
environments (Thomas et al., 2004). The lack of clinical detail can result in the 
ability to only identify what procedure is performed and not the reason why 
(Parente, 2002). This makes it impossible to effectively perform case-mix 
adjustments reflecting the diagnosis of the patient. This is a limited issue in South 
Africa where regulation requires that healthcare providers assign each claim with 
an International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 10 code, reflecting the diagnosis 
for which treatment is provided. 
Claims databases are also susceptible to questionable billing practices on the part 
of physicians (Ferver et al., 2009). In particular, physicians’ are often inclined to 
bill patients in such a way as to ensure reimbursement from the funder. Therefore, 
the physician may not be billing for services actually provided but for similar 
services that are covered by the funder and as such are sure to be reimbursed 
(Ferver et al., 2009). An example of this in the South African context is 
physicians’ incentive for claims to be classified as PMBs because funders are 
obligated to cover these claims in full (McLeod & Grobler, 2010). The result of 
this is that claims data may not properly represent the conditions being treated by 
physicians. Medscheme expressed that effort is exerted to ensure accurate billing 
by healthcare service providers. They were not, however, able to quantify the 
effect of poor billing practices on the data provided. 
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6.4.2 The data-cleaning process 
The above limitations require that a comprehensive data-cleaning process is 
performed to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the data. This is of particular 
importance when using DEA as it is a non-parametric and does not incorporate a 
stochastic error term (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, DEA is particularly sensitive 
to the quality of data and any noise present in the data used (Bogetoft & Otto, 
2010). The data checking procedures used in this study are those stated by Coelli 
et al. (2005) as essential to ensure data accuracy. The data were checked for the 
presence of outliers. This was done by calculating sample means, standard 
deviations, maximum and minimum values for the total healthcare service costs. 
In addition, the distributions for each of the 38 individual healthcare services were 
plotted. All questionable observations were investigated in more detail to ensure 
their accuracy.  The plots of the healthcare service costs were also analysed for 
the presence of unexpected trends in the data. Furthermore, the zeroes in the data 
were investigated to determine whether such values were appropriate. For 
example, having very low or zero costs for hospital services when profiling 
surgeons’ in-hospital admission indicates a problem. Finally, some basic ratios 
were calculated for all the surgeons, such as the individual healthcare costs per 
patient. A visual check of plots of these ratios was carried out to reveal further 
outliers. These data accuracy checks identified 1395 in-hospital admissions as 
having questionable accuracy. They were thus excluded from the profiling 
process. 
In addition, the claims data was considered on a DRG-level. This was to ensure 
that there was a sufficient number of each type of condition treated during the 
period. This is of particular important to ensure an appropriate level of statistical 
reliability when performing case-mix adjustment (discussed in Section 6.5.1). All 
DRGs with less than 10 hospital admissions assigned to it were removed. This 
removed 1322 hospital admission assigned to 379 DRGs; leaving 468 DRGs 
between which admissions were allocated. 
82 
 
To further ensure the profiling process maintains adequate reliability, the data 
cleaning process checked that all the surgeons had treated enough patients in 
2012. There are two possibilities as to why surgeons may exhibit small caseloads 
in 2012. First, different surgeons treated different numbers of patients in 2012. 
There are, therefore, surgeons who, for any number of reasons, treated very few 
patients in that year. Second, the data provided by Medscheme is claims data and 
thus represents only a percentage of each surgeon’s caseload (as discussed above). 
To ensure reliability, surgeons that treated less than 21 patients are excluded from 
the profiling process. The number ‘21’ was chosen as the cut-off by considering 
the caseload distribution of the 504 surgeons and removing the 20th percentile of 
surgeons with the smallest caseloads.  
The outcome of the data cleaning process revealed that the DEA profiling process 
undertaken in this study would comprise 403 surgeons who treated 78 135 
patients in 2012.  
6.4.3 Description of the data 
To get a better understanding of the data used it is important to provide a 
description and summary of the data on the 403 surgeons’ practices. This provides 
context to the analysis as well as allowing for a better understanding of the 
clinical nature of the data and the complexities surrounding case-mix adjustment, 
described in the next section. Tables 6.2, 6.3 & 6.4 provides a summary of the 




























Table 6.2    Admission-level summary statistics of data 
 
 
Min 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max 
Patient age 0 31 45 43 58 102 
Amount claimed per 




    
    Surgeon 400 1 046 1 754 3 235 3 422 341 800 
    Hospital 500 5105 10 140 22 720 21 350 1 509 000 
    Pathology  0 0 687 1 799 1 722 204 000 
    Anaesthetist 0 0 726 1 377 1 663 258 100 
    Radiology 0 0 0 1 279 949 91 770 
    Pharmacies 0 0 0 155 129 58 200 
    Total 1 100 8 400 15 960 33 820 32 470 243 7000 
       
 Table 6.3    List of top 30 most common DRGs 
DRG Quantity % of total admissions 
Other Gastroscopy W/O CC 4681 5.99% 
Other Gastroscopy W Major Diagnosis W/O CC 4255 5.45% 
Colonoscopy W/O CC 4002 5.12% 
Anal and Stomal Procedures W/O CC 3500 4.48% 
Circumcision W/O CC 3419 4.38% 
Colonoscopy W Major Diagnosis W/O CC 3199 4.09% 
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy CDE W/O CC 2753 3.52% 
Appendicectomy W/O CC 2533 3.24% 
Other Hernia Procedures (1 + yrs) W/O CC 2334 2.99% 
Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue and Breast Plastic W/O CC 2241 2.87% 
Minor Procedures for Breast Conditions W/O CC 1951 2.50% 
Other Gastroscopy W Major Diagnosis W CC 1895 2.43% 
Subcutaneous Tissue and Breast Procedures W/O CC 1877 2.40% 
Colonoscopy W Major Diagnosis W CC 1369 1.75% 
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy W Closed CDE W CC 1143 1.46% 
Other Digestive System Diagnoses W/O CC 855 1.09% 
Fundoplasty W/O CC 753 0.96% 
Other Gastroscopy W Major Diagnosis W MCC 664 0.85% 
Anal and Stomal Procedures W CC 624 0.80% 
Ventral Hernia Procedures W/O CC 594 0.76% 
Thyroid Procedures W/O CC 549 0.70% 
Major Procedures for Breast Conditions W/O CC 509 0.65% 
Vein Ligation and Stripping W/O CC 508 0.65% 
Other Hernia Procedures (1 + yrs) W CC 506 0.65% 
Other Debridement Procedures W/O CC 430 0.55% 
Cellulitis W/O CC 426 0.55% 
Major Small and Large Bowel Procedures W MCC 408 0.52% 
Major Small and Large Bowel Procedures W CC 397 0.51% 
Other Digestive System Diagnoses W CC 395 0.51% 












The tables above clearly illustrate the high level of complexity that exists when 
analysing the data from a clinical perspective. There for appropriate case-mix 
adjustment is essential together with seeking clinical expertise when analysing 
any results obtained. 
6.5 Variable selection process 
6.5.1 Choice of output  
As stated previously, the profiling process has one output. The precise definition 
for which is: the DRG case-mix adjusted number of in-hospital events treated by 
the general/ paediatric surgeons in 2012. Since this analysis is performed on a 
practice level, the output reflects all the in-hospital patients treated by the surgeon, 
and not limited to those with a specific condition or DRG. 
It should be noted that it is assumed that the surgeons do not have control over 
number of patients that they treat in the given study period. In addition, it is 
assumed that a particular surgeon does not have control over the demographic or 
health characteristics of these patients. In other words, the surgeons treat all the 
patients who approach them for treatment, regardless of their demographic and 
Table 6.4    Practice-level summary statistics of data 
 
 
Min 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Max 
Practice average 
patient age 
0 31 45 43 58 102 
Amount claimed per 




    
    Surgeon 50 950 269 700 458 700 629 900 734 800 4 726 000 
    Hospital 351 500 1 797 000 3 340 000 4 422 000 5 644 000 26 090 000 
    Pathology  13 740 129 300 244 400 350 500 457 700 2 565 000 
    Anaesthetist 15 430 101 200 214 200 266 700 353 600 2 209 000 
    Radiology 2 766 90 570 177 200 248 000 330 100 1 383 000 
    Pharmacies 1 281 8 129 20 500 30 220 41 960 58 200 
    Total 1 100 8 400 15 960 33 820 32 470 243 7000 




health status, or the severity of the condition needing treatment. This is of course 
conditional on the surgeon being qualified and capable to treat the patients’ 
conditions. This assumption is made as opposed to assuming that surgeons are 
able to actively increase the number of patients treated through, for example, 
marketing and/or actions taken to increase referrals from GPs. 
As discussed in Section 6.4, the decision to profile exclusively surgeons’ in-
hospital services was based on it allowing DRG case-mix adjustment to be 
performed. All the studies illustrated in Table 6.1 performed case-mix adjustment 
by using multiple outputs, each representing different risk adjusted quantities of 
treated patients. The DRG approach is chosen instead in this study because it 
homogenises the case-mix effectively while still keeping the number of variables 
as few as possible (Salem-Schatz et al., 1994). 
Case-mix adjustment using DRGs was first proposed by Fetter, Shin, Freeman, 
Averill, and Thompson (1980). DRGs are designed only for the classification of 
hospital admissions. DRGs can be described as resource homogeneous units of 
hospital activity based on ICD diagnoses, procedures, age, sex, discharge status, 
and the presence of complications or co-morbidities (Fetter & Freeman, 1986). 
Therefore, patients within each category are clinically similar and are expected to 
use the same level of hospital resources. The DRG approach is the most common 
case-mix adjustment technique for in-hospital events. 
The process of using DRGs for case-mix adjustment involves generating a case-
mix index (CMI). The DRG CMI calculated in this study is based on the claims 
data for the admissions included in the profiling process. The in-hospital events 
are classified into DRGs. Thereafter, the average cost of the in-hospital events 
assigned to each DRG are compared against the overall average of treating any 
hospital admission (Thompson, Fetter, & Mross, 1975). Therefore, each DRG is 
assigned a relative average value that indicates, on average, the cost of resources 
required to treat patients in that group, as compared to all the other DRGs. This 
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relative average value is called the ‘DRG case-mix ratio’. The above highlights 
the importance of cleaning the data on a DRG-level (discussed in Section 6.4.2 
above). If there are very few admissions in a particular DRG, then the average 
costs of hospital events calculated for that DRG will be based on insufficient data 
leading to potential inaccuracy. Making sure that only the DRGs with at least 10 
admissions attempts to avoid this problem and thus maintain the statistical 
reliability of the case-mix adjustment process. 
A ratio with a value greater than one means that in-hospital admissions classified 
with that DRG are, on average, more resource cost intensive than the norm (Fetter 
& Freeman, 1986). The opposite applies for a DRG case-mix ratio with a value of 
less than one. For example, a DRG with a case-mix ratio of value two indicates 
that, on average, patients assigned that DRG utilise twice the healthcare service 
costs than a patient assigned a DRG with ratio value one. Another way to think 
about this is that treating a patient with a case-mix ratio of value two is equivalent, 
from a resource cost perspective, to treating two single patients both with ratios of 
value one. The list of all case-mix ratios, one for each DRG, forms the CMI. The 
case-mix adjusted number of patients is then determined for each surgeon by 
summing the values of the DRG case-mix ratios allocated to each of their patients 
(Fetter & Freeman, 1986; Salem-Schatz et al., 1994).  
The potential downside of choosing surgeons as the speciality type to profile is 
the large number of surgery sub-specialities. As this analysis is a practice-level 
analysis, choosing a speciality that provides treatment to a large number of 
conditions results in the study being susceptible to the case-mix adjustment 
process not being able to allow for all the heterogeneity among the surgeons 
practices. In addition, even if the DRG case-mix adjustment is able to homogenise 
surgeons’ practices based on resource utilisation, it is still necessary to take 
careful note of the surgeons’ case-mix when interpreting the results in order to 
ensure that surgeons’ efficiency is comparable from a clinical perspective. As 
noted in Section 5.2.4, a surgeon exclusively performing organ transplants should 
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not be compared to one that performs predominantly colonoscopies. Therefore, 
when applying the results of a practice-level analysis is essential to interpret the 
results with an individual with expert clinical knowledge of the surgeons’ 
practices.  
The above highlights the significant complication that case-mix adjustment has in 
the results of a practice-level analysis and the interpretation thereof. It is, 
therefore, important to reiterate that a significant implicit assumption is being 
made. It is being assumed that the above case-mix adjustment adequately 
homogenises surgeons’ practices regarding the resource intensity of the conditions 
treated. Any persisting heterogeneity will subject the results obtained to potential 
reduced accuracy and interpretability. 
6.5.2 Choice of inputs 
When treating a patient it is noted that the surgeon chooses, for example, the 
hospital in which treatment is performed, the anaesthetist used, the amount of 
pharmaceuticals utilised etc. Therefore, even though surgeons are only reimbursed 
for the services they personally provide; from the funder’s perspective, the 
surgeon determines the level of the total costs reimbursed for all services utilised 
to treat a patient. Chilingerian and Sherman (1990, p. 4) explain that “it is the 
physician who is ultimately in charge of the patient’s care and recovery, and 
depending on the requirements of the patient as interpreted by the physician, each 
patient receives a unique, highly customized bundle of products and services”. 
Therefore, it is assumed in this study that the surgeons being profiled are 
responsible for the total cost of healthcare services utilised to treat the patients.  
As a result of the above, the profiling methodology need only have one exhaustive 
input: the total cost of services utilised to treat a particular physician’s patient 
population. The issue with only using the total cost is that the methodology will 
not be able to provide information to the funder as to the source of the surgeon’s 
inefficiency. This is because it will not be possible to decompose individual 
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healthcare service cost efficiency from the overall efficiency scores.  As a result, 
the total cost needs to be disaggregated into its component healthcare service costs 
before the model is run. This is done by assigning individual healthcare service 
costs as distinct inputs. The question arises as to what is the appropriate level of 
disaggregation. The model cannot be fully disaggregated, as it will have very little 
power to discern efficiency if all 38 categories of healthcare service are included 
as individual inputs. 
The starting point of the disaggregation process was to consider which services 
are most frequently used by surgeons in treating patients as well as which services 
make up the greatest percentage of the total cost. The cost of the remaining 
services is aggregated in a single input called ‘total other costs’.  The rationale 
here is to include as inputs the services that form the most significant part of 
physicians’ treatment process and will therefore represent important potential 
sources of inefficiency. Table 6.5 shows the services that are most utilised and 










Table 6.5    Disaggregated healthcare services that are the most significant in the 





with this service 
Cost attributed to 




Surgeon  100% R253 867 644.47 9.58% 
Hospital 100% R1 782 151 950.69 67.22% 
Pathology  74.03% R141 234 145.62 5.33% 
Anaesthetist 54.46% R107 477 100.19 4.05% 
Radiology 41.37% R99 962 952.58 3.77% 
General Medical Practice 39.55% R32 240 352.32 1.22% 
Pharmacies 38.44% R12 177 502.63 0.46% 
Independent Specialist Practice 16.47% R49 296 630.79 1.86% 





The health services identified in Table 6.5 can only be incorporated as inputs into 
the DEA profiling approach, however, if they satisfy the variable requirements 
discussed in Section 5.28. All these inputs are conceptually distinct as they 
represent services provided by different types of healthcare service provider. 
Therefore, each input explains the separate role played by that healthcare service 
in treating surgeons’ populations of patients. However, considering the inter-
correlations of the services (illustrated in Table 6.6), it is revealed that radiology 
and pathology services are highly correlated to hospital services as well as to one 
another. This intuitively makes sense because high hospital service costs are often 
the result of more complicated and/or severe surgeries needing longer time in the 
operating room and longer recovery time in the ward. Complicated and/or severe 
surgeries often also need more tests to diagnose and monitor the patient (such as 









                                                          
8 The requirement of homogeneity is ensured by case-mix adjustment discussed in Section 
6.5.1. The requirement of accuracy is met through the data accuracy checks discussed in 
Section 6.4.2. The requirements of measurability and quantifiability are also obviously 
met. Therefore, only the remaining requirements (distinct and exhaustive) are considered. 
Table 6.6    Input variable inter-correlations 
Surgeon  1.00         
 Hospital 0.78 1.00        
 Pathology  0.68 0.91 1.00       
Anaesthetist 0.76 0.70 0.58 1.00      
 Radiology 0.75 0.86 0.89 0.62 1.00     
 General Medical Practice 0.40 0.52 0.54 0.02 0.52 1.00    
 Pharmacies 0.63 0.71 0.69 0.58 0.70 0.45 1.00   
 Independent Specialist Practice 0.55 0.73 0.79 0.48 0.76 0.47 0.54 1.00  




Hence, both higher pathology and radiology services are coupled with higher 
hospital service costs and, as such, pathology and radiology services are also 
correlated to one another. In spite of this, it is important to monitor the efficiency 
of pathology and radiology services to ensure that surgeons are not conducting 
unnecessary tests on their patients. Therefore, it is decided that it is necessary to 
keep both of these as inputs in the model, as they represent important potential 
sources of inefficiency. 
The inputs in Table 6.5 are by definition collectively exhaustive. This is because 
together they represent the total costs of health services utilised by surgeons to 
treat their patients. However, the correlations between the inputs and output need 
to be considered. This is in order to ensure that all the healthcare services have 
individual impact on the case-mix adjusted number of patients treated. Table 6.7 
illustrates that ‘general practice’ and ‘independent specialist’ services have low 
correlations with the case-mix adjusted number of patients. Furthermore, both 
these services contribute small percentages of total costs (Table 6.4). As a result, 
these services are interpreted to not have significant individual effect in 









Table 6.7    Input – output variable correlations 
 
 
Case-mix adjusted no. 
of patients 
 Surgeon  0.79 
 Hospital 0.95 
 Pathology  0.85 
 Anaesthetist 0.70 
 Radiology 0.84 
 General Medical Practice 0.57 
 Pharmacies 0.74 
 Independent Specialist Practice 0.68 




Six disaggregated healthcare services therefore meet the required variable 
requirements. A parsimonious model is, thereby, achieved with seven inputs and 








6.6 Defining the DEA model used 
The final step of the profiling methodology is determining which of the classic 
DEA models, discussed in Section 5, is most appropriate in this study. It has been 
previously stated that this study is the first to investigate of use of a DEA 
approach for physician profiling in South Africa. Therefore, only the classic DEA 
models are considered in this study as it would be premature at this point to 
investigate the use of more complicated DEA models. The choice of the model to 
use involves determining which production assumptions can realistically be made 
when defining the technology set, as well as deciding on the method followed to 
measure efficiency. 
The appropriateness of the production assumptions is considered intuitively. No 
rigorous mathematical proof of the suitably of particular assumptions is 
undertaken. The basic determinism postulate holds because all surgeons profiled 
will be included in the DEA model.  The assumptions of non-negativity and weak 














essentiality are also easily shown to apply. Non-negativity holds because the 
inputs are monetary amounts reimbursed for healthcare services and are, 
therefore, finite, non-negative, real amounts with a minimum value of zero. Weak 
essentiality holds because a patient can only by treated using of some combination 
of healthcare services. Therefore, if all the inputs are zero the surgeon will have 
treated no patients, and thus produced zero output.  
The return to scale property that is assumed is that of variable returns to scale 
(VRS). The reason for this is that it is the easiest return-to-scale assumption to 
make, as it is the weakest. It therefore avoids the need to prove a priori that the 
surgeon is able to rescale his production in order to optimise his/her efficiency. A 
consequence of using a VRS DEA model is that the profiling process does not 
reflect scale efficiency. 
The determination of whether the free disposability and convexity assumptions 
hold is more complicated as both hinge on proving two further assumptions; that 
the inputs and outputs are divisible and not subject to congestion. The costs of 
services are by their nature divisible. The case-mix adjusted number of patients is 
allowed to be any decimal amount, with any rounding necessary performed in the 
analysis of the results. Therefore, the inputs and output chosen in this 
investigation are divisible as they need not be integers. The assumption of 
congestion is simpler to prove in a single output model (as is the case in this 
study). This is because the congestion assumption becomes the converse of the 
free disposability assumption.  Intuitively, if a surgeon is able to treat his/her 
patient population with the observed level of healthcare services then increasing 
his/her utilisation has two possible outcomes. First, the extra services can be used 
to provide more extensive treatment to same number of patients. Second, the extra 
services can be used to treat a greater number of patients. Utilising a greater 
amount of services cannot result in a surgeon treating fewer patients. Therefore, 
free disposability is intuitively expected to hold. Since all the above production 
assumptions are met the DEA model exhibits the minimum extrapolation principle 
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and thus produces a conservative measure of efficiency. 
The next it needs to be decided which of the two DEA methods of efficiency 
measurement will be used. An envelopment model is used because it provides 
information relative to the reference set of each physician. Therefore, the model 
will not only provide a measure of efficiency but also provides the set of peers 
against which a particular surgeon is deemed inefficient. This provides the 
inefficient surgeon with efficient peers whose practices may be analysed in order 
to potentially achieve efficiency improvements. The combination of assuming 
VRS and using an envelopment model means that the efficiency scores are 
determined using the BCC model discussed in Section 5.3. 
Furthermore, an input orientated DEA model is used. This is because it is 
assumed that the surgeon is in control of all the healthcare services used to treat 
their patients. Additionally, it assumed that the surgeon has no control of the 
number, characteristics or types of patients that are treated (discussed in 
Section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 above).  
Therefore, to summarise, the profiling methodology uses a 7-input 1-output input-
orientated BCC model to determine the combination of relative technical and 
price efficiency of 403 general/ paediatric surgeons in providing in-hospital 
services in 2012. The model was run using the statistical software 
R version 3.0.39. The DEA algorithms used were obtained from the R-package 
called ‘Benchmarking’, developed by Peter Bogetoft and Lars Otto.  
  
                                                          
9 R is a language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. It was 
developed at Bell Laboratories (formerly AT&T, now Lucent Technologies) by John 





This section discusses the results obtained from the profiling methodology 
described above. A summary of the profiling results is presented and thereafter a 
more detailed analysis is conducted. The aim of the analysis is to inform the 
funder’s initial steps in designing and implementing efficiency improvement 
interventions. It is important to note that the results below are analysed solely 
from a statistical perspective. Access was not available to an individual with 
clinical expertise regarding the data and surgeons’ practices. Therefore, all results 
obtained will require additional interpretation together with a clinical expert to 
determine if they are applicable in practice. In addition it should be noted that 
graphical representation was found to be of little use in displaying results. This is 
due to the large number of surgeons profiled. Consequently, the results below are 
represented using summary statistics. 
7.1 High-level summary of surgeon performance 
Table 7.1 illustrates a summary of the 403 surgeons’ efficiency scores determined 
by the DEA profiling process. There are 58 surgeons perceived efficient, 
constituting approximately 14.4% of those profiled.  The remaining 345 are found 
to be able to improve their efficiency to some extent relative to their peers. The 
profiling process, thus, reveals substantial scope for efficiency improvements. 
More that 85% of surgeons profiled are potentially able to increase their 
efficiency by reducing the cost and/or quantity of healthcare services utilised to 
treat their populations of patients.  The mean efficiency score of the inefficient 
surgeons is 0.68. This indicates that, on average, the surgeons found to be 
inefficient are required to proportionally reduce their input levels by 32% in order 
to reach the optimal level of efficiency. The individual surgeon determined most 
inefficient by the model attained an efficiency score of 0.35. This means that the 
cost and/or quantity of healthcare services utilised by this surgeon would have to 
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be decreased by a massive 65% in order to achieve optimal technical and price 
efficiency. 
Since a dual model was used to obtain the efficiency scores, each inefficient 
surgeon is also assigned their efficient peers and the corresponding weights λj. 
These illustrate the efficient surgeons that each inefficient surgeon was compared 
to in the determination their efficiency score. 
It should be noted that these results do not illustrate the efficiency of surgeons’ 
whole practices. This is because only surgeons’ efficiency in providing in-hospital 
services is profiled. In addition, only price and technical efficiency is assessed. 
The efficiency scores do not provide insight in surgeons other types of efficiency. 
The process also may not have included all the patients treated by a particular 
surgeon. This is due to the feature of claims data (discussed in Section 6.4.1) that 
only beneficiaries of the medical schemes administrated by Medscheme are 
present in the process.  
Furthermore, these results do not portray surgeons’ efficiency relative to all the 
other surgeons practicing in the South African private healthcare sector. 
Efficiency scores only reflect efficiency relative to the 403 surgeons included in 
the process. It is, therefore, also clear that these results are not a reflection of the 







Table 7.1    Summary of surgeon performance 
 Efficiency score classification 
 Overall Efficient Inefficient 0.75 - 1 0.5 - 0.75 >0.5 
 No. of 
surgeons 








7.2 Further analysis 
The next step is to consider whether the high-level summary above can be broken 
down into more detail in order to determine if the surgeons present any clinical 
characteristics explaining their efficiency, or lack thereof. Unfortunately data 
were not available regarding the particular characteristics of the surgeons. This 
would have allowed detailed analysis of the efficiency score based on such 
external factors as: age, expertise and sub-speciality of the surgeon as well as 
details on the facilities in which treatments were provided. 
It is, however, possible to analyse the results according to the size of the case-load 
of the surgeon and the variety of patients treated by a surgeon. Table 7.2 
illustrates summary statistics of surgeons’ efficiency scores according to the 
number of admissions treated. Observation of the mean efficiency scores in the 
respective categories points to potential scale efficiencies. Future research to 
include the measurement of scale efficiency in the DEA profiling process is 










Table 7.2    Summary of surgeon performance according to case-load 
 Case-load ranges 
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
 Size of case-load 21-76 77-145   146-246 246-1061 
 No. of surgeons 104 98 101 100 
 No. of efficient 
surgeons 
18 9 9 22 
 No. of inefficient 
surgeons 
86 89 92 78 
 Mean efficiency 
score 
0.69 0.68 0.72 0.80 
 Mean score of 
inefficient surgeons 




Table 7.3 provides a summary of the surgeons’ performance based on the variety 
of admissions treated. The variety of surgeons’ admissions is based on the number 
of unique DRGs treated by the surgeon. It is observed from Table 7.3 that the 
efficiency score increases as the number of admission with unique DRGs treated 
increased. This result is unexpected because it is intuitively hypothesised that 
surgeons specialising in the treatment of particular types of conditions would be 
able to treat those conditions more efficiently. This result may, however, be 
distorted by the scale effect illustrated in Table 7.2. This is because it is observed 












When considering both of the results above it is important to remember that only a 
portion of surgeons’ case-load forms part of the analysis (discussed in 
Section 6.4.1). As a result, the surgeons may have treated additional patients, 
Table 7.3    Summary of surgeon performance according to variety of admissions 
treated 
 Ranges of unique DRGs treated 
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
No. of unique DRGs 7-37 38-61   62-86 87-215 
 No. of surgeons 102 102 98 101 
 No. of efficient 
surgeons 
22 8 4 24 
 No. of inefficient 
surgeons 
80 94 94 77 
 Mean efficiency 
score 
0.71 0.67 0.71 0.80 
 Mean score of 
inefficient surgeons 




which may have potentially been more varied in nature. The results above can 
therefore only be interpreted to represent the admissions included in the analysis 
and not surgeons overall practices.  
The above to results are, however, successful at illustrating the clinical 
complexity that exists between varying surgeon practices. The statistical analysis 
must consider these complexities in order to form actionable interventions.  
7.3 Focusing on the ‘problem’ cases 
When analysing the performance results from a physician profiling process it is 
important for the funder to consider the extent of inefficiency. Efficiency 
improvement interventions focused on physicians deemed only slightly inefficient 
will be difficult to design, for the following reasons. The validity of low 
inefficiency levels may be questionable since DEA is a non-parametric approach 
with no stochastic error term. A physician exhibiting low levels of inefficiency 
may just be reflecting the unaccounted for random variation in the variables 
chosen or just noise in the data (Cook & Zhu, 2006). This includes persisting 
heterogeneity in the case-mix of physicians profiled.  In addition, it is difficult to 
determine the source of low levels of inefficiency (Eijkenaar & van Vliet, 2013). 
Furthermore, what the DEA model deems theoretically possible and what is 
practically possible may be different. In reality these physicians may often be 
operating at or very close to optimal efficiency (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). In 
addition, getting the cooperation of a physician to agree to interventions with very 
small potential gain may be difficult and the physician may feel like their 
practices are being micro-managed by the funder. This can quickly lead to the 
deterioration of the relationship between the physician and the funder. In any case, 
it is likely that the funder will save far more financially from focusing on the 
physicians portraying severe deficiencies in their ability to operate efficiently.  
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Table 7.1 also breaks the efficiency scores into bands in order to determine those 
surgeons whose efficiency levels are of most concern. It can be seen that there are 
37 surgeons who, in order to be deemed efficient, need to at least halve the 
quantity and/or price of the healthcare services utilised. Interventions to improve 
the efficiency should begin by focusing on these 37 surgeons that are of most 
concern; before moving on to interventions aimed at increasing the efficiency of 
the 196 surgeons exhibiting approximately average efficiency scores. Finally, 
interventions aimed at fine-tuning the efficiency of the rest of the surgeons 
exhibiting low levels of efficiency should be considered, keeping in mind the 
challenges addressed at the start of this subsection.  
7.4 Financial savings of efficiency 
Since the inputs are expressed in monetary terms, the analysis can be used to 
determine the reduction in claims potentially achievable from surgeons increasing 
their level of efficiency to that of their peers. However, determining the financial 
savings in this context will only really be a theoretical exercise. The reason for 
this is that the savings achievable are dictated by the varying types of procedures 
performed by the surgeons as well as the particular characteristics of the surgeons 
themselves. Consequently, the claims reduction figures are not included in this 
analysis because without clinical verification there is no way of providing a sense 
as to whether these figures are realistically achievable by the surgeons profiled. 
It is also important to revisit the discussion from Section 3.4 that the funder has no 
direct ability to impact on how a physician practices. The funder can only use 
incentives, education and relationships with the surgeons in order to encourage 
them to change their behaviour to achieve more efficient practices. Any savings 
from interventions informed by this study rests on the funder being able to engage 
effectively with the surgeons. Effective engagement with surgeons will take time 
in order to generate sufficient trust between the parties. It is also likely that 
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interventions will need the backing of the professional societies to which surgeons 
belong. 
7.5 Drivers of efficiency 
In order to design interventions to improve efficiency it is important to understand 
which healthcare services are most responsible for whether a surgeon is deemed 
efficient or inefficient. It is not a given that the healthcare services that offer the 
greatest scope for financial savings will represent the major determinant of 
efficiency in the model. This is because it may be the case that surgeons’ efficient 
utilisation of one of the other services drives more efficient utilisation of the 
remaining healthcare services used. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed in order to determine which inputs in the model 
are most significant in determining the efficiency score. This is done using two 
approaches. Both make the assumption that the 7-input-1-output DEA model is 
the ‘true’ model determining a surgeon’s ‘actual’ level of efficiency. Changes are 
then made to the nature and form of the inputs used and the sensitivity of the 
‘true’ model to these changes are then analysed.  In first approach a 6-input 1-
output DEA model is run six times and in each iteration one of the six distinct 
inputs in the ‘true’ model is re-aggregated to form part of ‘Total Other’ costs. 
(Recall for Section 6.5.2 that the ‘Total Other’ costs represent the healthcare 
service costs not initially deemed to be significant enough in the treatment of 
patients to justify them being disaggregated into a distinct input). The set of six 
new efficiency scores are then analysed to reveal the service whose re-aggregation 
had the greatest impact on the efficiency scores, relative to the ‘true’ model. The 
idea here is to determine which of the healthcare services initially deemed most 
significant in the treatment of patients would result in the least impact to the 
efficiency scores if it were re-aggregated with the ‘Total Other’ costs. In other 
words, the healthcare services that result in the least change in efficiency scores 
relative to the ‘true’ model have the least descriptive power over the ‘Total Other’ 
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costs in discerning the level of efficiency. The healthcare services that result in the 
biggest change in efficiency scores most need to be distinct inputs in their own 
right, considering the high level of descriptive power they have. Note that the 
inputs and outputs in each 6-input-1-output DEA model still meet all the 
necessary requirements discussed in Section 5. 
The second sensitivity analysis approach runs another seven 6-input-1-output 
DEA models. This time, each iteration completely removes one input from those 
included in the ‘true’ model. Therefore, the cost of treatment attributable to that 
healthcare service no longer features in the model and is no longer a part of 
surgeons’ production transformation process yielding treated populations of 
patients. The results are studied to reveal the healthcare service that induces the 
most changed efficiency scores. The models run no longer meet the essential 
requirement of DEA that the model inputs be exhaustive. In other words, the 
inputs in the new model no longer capture all the resources having bearing on the 
output produced and the type of efficiency being assessed. This allows for the 
measurement of the effect that the excluded input has in determining the 
efficiency levels of surgeons in the ‘true’ model.  
The above two approaches were conducted by Kittelsen (1993). He explains that 
the combination of the above two sensitivity analyses provide an indication of the 
inputs having the greatest effect in altering the ‘goodness of fit’ of the ‘true’ 
model. The first approach, therefore, can be thought of altering the inputs to 
determine which input upon re-aggregation most alters the shape of the 
production transformation process from that in the ‘true’ model. The second 
approach determines which inputs most describe the actual production 
transformation process itself used in the ‘true’ model.   
The healthcare service costs found to be the greatest driver of efficiency are those 
of the profiled surgeons themselves (Table 7.4). This is an important result and 
can be explained intuitively. It has previously been explained that surgeons are 
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not only responsible for the services they provide but also control the treatment 
process and decide on the particular bundle of healthcare services that their 
patients will receive. The fact that the surgeon’s own services are the greatest 
driver of efficiency illustrate that surgeons who exhibit efficiency in the provision 
of their own services relay this onto the rest of their decisions made in the 














For example, the surgeon may choose other service providers, such as 
anaesthetists, that demonstrate efficient provision of care. The surgeon may not 
recommend the patient undergo excessive or expensive radiology and pathology 
tests or prescribe unnecessary pharmaceuticals. The surgeon may ensure that the 
Table 7.4    Sensitivity analysis results 
 
Mean score of inefficient 
surgeons 
‘True’ model 0.68 
Re-aggregated  category of 







Removed category of 












care provided in hospital is not inefficient. This includes making sure that patients 
are discharged on time and not provided unnecessarily wasteful services, such as, 
placing a patient in an ICU or high-care ward when adequate recovery can take 
place in a general ward.  
7.6 Dominant peers 
Finally, it is useful for the funder to identify the most ‘dominant’ peers out of the 
surgeons deemed efficient. ‘Dominant’ is represented by two features of a peer. 
First, by how many surgeons are deemed inefficient based on the comparison with 
that efficient surgeon. Second, by how many surgeons were deemed inefficient 
based predominantly on the optimal efficiency that surgeon was able to achieve. 
This is done by determining which of the peers in the reference unit had the 
highest weight, λj
10 .  
The benefit of isolating these dominant peers arises when attempting to design 
efficiency improvement interventions. The 7-input-1-output DEA model in this 
investigation produced 58 surgeons that were perceived to be operating efficiently 
in 2012. However, analysing the practices of 58 individual surgeons in order to 
reveal commonalities that can inform interventions is incredibly difficult. 
Table 7.5 identifies 8 dominant peers from those profiled. These surgeons 
together represent the peers that are most significant in determining the efficiency 
scores of 80% of the inefficient surgeons. This simplifies the job of designing 
interventions by only having to analyse the efficient practices of these 8 surgeons. 
At the very least, it provides the 8 surgeons whose practices should form the 
starting point of any efficiency improvement interventions. 
 
 
                                                          
10 The details surrounding ‘reference units’ and ‘peers’ are discussed in Section 5.5.2 
104 
 
  Table 7.5    Dominant peers 
Peer reference no. 
No. for which 
significant peer 
No. for which 
peer 
236 54 116 
187 52 145 
209 51 97 
186 48 242 
61 31 87 
400 15 101 
382 13 37 




8 Conclusions and discussions  
The profiling of physicians locally and abroad is widespread, testament to its 
value to funders in achieving managed care objectives. This dissertation sets out 
to investigate the potential use of a DEA profiling approach by South African 
funders. This is done by applying a DEA profiling methodology to evaluate the 
price and technical efficiency of 403 general/ paediatric surgeons’ utilisation of 
in-hospital services in 2012. This section analyses the DEA profiling 
methodology followed and the results obtained in order to conclude on its 
usefulness to South African healthcare funders. This section, first, highlights the 
attributes of the DEA profiling approach that support its use by South African 
funders. This is followed by a discussion on the limitations of the DEA approach 
as well as the further research necessary to address these limitations.    
8.1 Attributes of a DEA profiling approach supporting its use   
8.1.1 The requirement to conceptualise the production process 
Potentially the most valuable aspect of profiling using a DEA approach is that it is 
entirely based on the physicians’ production transformation process. The DEA 
profiling approach, therefore, necessitates that the profiler fully understand the 
process by which physicians utilise healthcare services to treat patients. In 
particular, this involves appreciation of all the healthcare services the physician is 
responsible for in the treatment of their patients. This ensures the basic 
requirement that the profiler be clear on the responsibilities of the physicians 
being assessed before determining whether these are being performed efficiently. 
In addition, it provides a holistic view of the healthcare services utilised by a 
physician and prevents misleading outcomes resulting from considering resource 
efficiency from only one perspective. The risk of not properly understanding 
physicians’ production process is the potential misclassification of efficiency as 
well as ineffective efficiency improvement interventions.  
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The above benefit is illustrated by considering the discussion regarding a GP’s 
production process in Section 6.2. If the GPs’ production process were not 
initially considered then profiling may have be performed without allowing for 
the fact that they are responsible for the level of downstream costs. Consequently, 
the profiling process may have deemed certain GPs efficient when in fact their 
efficiency is generated by a high referral rates to more-expensive specialists.  
In terms of the profiling of surgeons in this study, the profiler is forced to express 
efficiency in terms of the specific production process of the surgeons analysed. 
This ensures that healthcare costs included in the DEA profiling approach 
represent the particular bundle of services that the surgeon decides their patients 
need in order to be treated effectively. Therefore, the 403 surgeons’ efficiency 
scores are based on the healthcare services that they are responsible for in the 
treatment of patients and which they can affect in order to improve efficiency.  
This is particularly beneficial to funders in South Africa who outsource managed 
care functions to administrators or MCOs. Conceptualising the surgeons’ 
production process prevents the blind use, by these 3rd parties, of performance 
evaluation techniques without determining their suitability for profiling surgeon 
performance. Funders can, therefore, be more confident that the outcomes of 
profiling processes and the interventions they inform are effective and achievable.  
A proper understanding of the production transformation process is also a major 
advantage when it comes to presenting inefficient surgeons with their profiles. A 
surgeon is more likely to cooperate with any interventions if the funder is able to 
portray an understanding of surgeons’ practices. This assures the surgeon that the 
funder is providing information that they can utilise to improve their efficiency. 
8.1.2 Multiple inputs and outputs 
DEA explicitly allows for the inclusion of multiple inputs and outputs. This 
allows for the conceptualised production process to include multiple healthcare 
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services as inputs. In this study, this allowed for the important healthcare services 
utilised by surgeons in the treatment of patients to be disaggregated and included 
as separate inputs in the model. The result of this is that these healthcare services 
could be analysed to determine their significance in driving surgeons’ overall 
efficiency, and the scope for savings related to each service.  
This information is very useful in the design of efficiency improvement 
interventions. It revealed that the efficient utilisation of hospital services provides 
the greatest potential for financial savings. However, the surgeons own practice is 
the greatest driver of efficiency. This means that interventions aimed at 
motivating surgeons to provide their own services efficiently may lead to more 
efficient decision-making regarding the other healthcare service utilised in the 
treatment of their patients.  
In addition, the ability to include multiple inputs further allows for a holistic 
profiling process and averts the complication of profiling individual factors 
separately. DEA accounts for the inherent relationships among the inputs 
themselves as well as between the inputs and the outputs. Other profiling 
techniques may require the individual analysis of each input e.g. risk assessment 
models. This may provide a distorted view of physician efficiency if the 
relationships between these inputs and outputs are not understood and defined 
correctly. 
8.1.3 Conservative efficiency estimates 
As discussed in Section 5, DEA is unique in the way it estimates the technology 
set. In this study, the minimum extrapolation principle is shown to hold and thus 
surgeons are given the highest efficiency score possible based on the input-output 
combination of their peers. The benefits of this are best explained by considering 
the 37 surgeons found to be most inefficient. These surgeons are found to be 
severely inefficient even after the DEA approach provides them with the highest 
efficiency score possible.  
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The benefit of a cautiousness measure is that it provides greater confidence that 
the profiling approach is actually identifying inefficiency. These surgeons’ 
inefficiency cannot be interpreted as a consequence of the standard being set too 
high against which efficiency is being assessed. On the contrary, these 37 
surgeons have achieved poor efficiency despite the efficiency standard being as 
favourable to them as possible. If the model was not so ‘kind’ their efficiency 
scores would have been far worse. Therefore, the DEA profiling approach is 
particularly suited at identifying those surgeons whose inefficiency is of particular 
concern. The DEA approach highlights the surgeons that are required to form part 
of initial efficiency-improvement interventions.  
A cautious measure of efficiency provides further benefit when it comes to 
presenting inefficient surgeons with their profiles. Cautious efficiency scores can 
help avoid an inefficient surgeon from contesting the results based on being 
compared to an ‘unfair’ standard of efficiency. A surgeon may be more obliged to 
acknowledge their inefficiency if the profiler is able to assure the surgeon that the 
approach provided them with the highest score possible. This, in turn, may result 
in improved cooperation by the surgeon to engage in funder’s proposed 
interventions aimed at increasing their efficiency. 
8.1.4 Comparison with best-practice peers 
As previously stated, DEA does not only provide an efficiency score it also 
provides reference units of best-practice peers from whom inefficient physicians’ 
scores are determined. Each of the 345 surgeons found to be inefficient can be 
provided with the set of peers against whom they were perceived to operate 
inefficiently. Funders can thus provide each inefficient surgeon with personalised 
information regarding the set of efficient surgeons whose practices they can 
attempt to emulate in order to increase efficiency.   
Comparison with a best-practice frontier also provides further benefits when 
presenting the results to surgeons. First, the DEA profiling approach frames 
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surgeons’ efficiency relative to what their peers are able to achieve. As previously 
expressed, recommendations by the funder based on efficiency in this form may 
lend itself to greater cooperation by surgeons. Second, from a funder perspective, 
the interventions informed from the DEA profiling approach will encourage 
surgeons to increase their efficiency to levels achieved by the best performing 
surgeons. This is opposed to encouraging surgeons to just demonstrate above 
average efficiency.  
In addition, the results of the profiling of surgeons in this study illustrate that the 
DEA approach allows for the determination of dominant peers. This simplifies the 
process by which the funder is able to design interventions that individually 
improve the efficiency of a large percentage of surgeons. Identifying the dominant 
peers in this study decreased the number of surgeons required to consider when 
designing interventions by up to 50. The results of the DEA approach reflect that 
analysis of the efficient practices of just the 8 dominant surgeons has the potential 
to improve the efficiency of up to 80% of the surgeons profiled. 
8.2 Limitations and further research 
8.2.1 Quality 
The major limitation of this study is the absence of quality measures in the DEA 
profiling approach. Quality is excluded due to the complication of defining quality 
measures and the uncertainty regarding where to include quality within surgeons’ 
production transformation process (discussed in Section 5.2). As stated 
previously, the absence of quality measures results in the implicit assumptions 
that the care provided by all profiled surgeons is of the same quality. This is a 
very strong assumption that is at the very least subjective, however, likely to be 
untrue. Therefore, profiling is only being evaluated from one dimension of 
performance; the technical and price efficiency of resource utilisation.  
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There are two competing views regarding the relationship between physicians’ 
quality of care and healthcare service utilisation. One view proposed by 
Chilingerian and Sherman (1990)  is that the quality of physician care is directly 
proportional to the healthcare resources invested in a patient. This can be 
explained as a ‘more is better’ proposition. More medical care, represented by 
physicians investing more healthcare resources in their patients, will always 
improve the quality of treatment outcomes. An alternative view expressed by 
Enthoven (2002) suggests that the utilisation of healthcare resources is subject to 
diminishing marginal returns with respect to the quality of care provided. For 
example, assume a patient undergoes a complex surgery. The first day of recovery 
in a hospital ward is essential and so is the second. However, each subsequent day 
makes less difference to the patient’s health status. In time, an additional day in 
the ward will yield no further benefit at all (Enthoven, 2002). 
If the first point of view is assumed representative of reality, the exclusion of 
quality from the DEA approach exposes the variation of efficiency scores to be 
representative of differences in quality of care, and not inefficient resource 
utilisation in the provision of care. For example, surgeons’ resource inefficiency 
may be sanctioned by the fact that through increased healthcare service costs 
superior treatment outcomes were possible; represented by, for example, lower 
mortality and/or readmission rates. In this study, the 37 surgeons perceived to be 
highly resource inefficient relative to their peers may be able to justify the use of 
more resources. Their extra utilisation may not be wasteful but representative of 
the superior quality of treatment they have provided to their populations of 
patients. Furthermore, the 58 efficient surgeons may be achieving their resource 
utilisation efficiency at the expense of providing substandard quality of care 
relative to that of inefficient surgeons. Chilingerian and Sherman (1990) do 
concede that this point of view is overly simplistic. Intuitively, the actual 
relationship between quality of care and healthcare service utilisation lies closer to 
that proposed by Enthoven (2002). It is, however, difficult without empirical 
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evaluation to be certain as to the effect of this view on the interpretation of 
surgeons’ observed efficiency scores. 
Further research is thus required in order to construct a two-dimensional profiling 
methodology that considers both resource utilisation and quality of care. This 
requires investigation of the most appropriate quality measures as well as the 
manner in which these measures should be incorporated in the DEA profiling 
methodology.  
8.2.2 Case-mix 
A theme throughout this study is the significance of effective case-mix adjustment 
to homogenise the DEA process. This is a particular limitation of practice-level 
analyses. Even though the methodology followed undertook to apply the most 
appropriate and effective case-mix adjustment process possible, the results are 
still vulnerable to heterogeneity from any case-mix differences unaccounted for. 
Further research is necessary on alternative case-mix adjustment processes to 
determine whether the one performed in this study can be improved upon. 
In addition, the results obtained need to be assessed for clinical applicable by an 
individual with appropriate expertise. This is essential to transform the analysis in 
this study from a theoretical exercise into one that is able to inform actual 
efficiency improvement interventions. 
Further research on applying procedural-level DEA profiling analyses is also 
necessary. These analyses are less sensitive to case-mix complications. 
Comparing the results of a procedural analysis to the ones obtained in this study 
may be able to provide valuable support to the accuracy of results obtained above.   
8.2.3 Non-parametric 
One of the defining features of DEA is that it is a non-parametric frontier analysis 
approach. As previously mentioned, the advantage of this is that it does not 
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require a priori assumptions regarding the distribution characteristics of the 
inputs, outputs or the production frontier. This avoids jeopardising the validity of 
profiling results, through efficiency scores determined based on an incorrect 
choice of distribution function. 
There are, however, consequences to using a non-parametric approach. Parametric 
approaches incorporate an error term assumed to have a particular distribution 
function. This error term is incorporated to capture any random fluctuation arising 
due to incorrect model-fit and/or any noise in the data. In the absence of an error 
term, the implicit assumption is made that the model is the ‘true’ representation of 
reality and the data is absent of any noise. If this is not the case then variations in 
efficiency scores observed from the DEA profiling approach are not 
representative of actual differences in efficiency but rather random error that is 
not being properly allowed for.  
When interpreting the efficiency scores of surgeons in this study, it is assumed 
that there is some random fluctuation unaccounted for. This is expressed as one of 
the justifications for focusing on surgeons that are observed to be highly 
inefficient. Surgeons with low levels of efficiency are recognised as potentially 
being misclassified due to random fluctuation present in the DEA approach. 
Nevertheless, further research into ‘stochastic’ DEA models is required to 
determine if superior results can be obtained by the incorporation of a stochastic 
error term. 
8.2.4 Data 
Characteristics of the data used in this study affecting the interpretation of 
surgeons’ efficiency scores are (1) the profiling process measures exclusively 
surgeons’ efficiency at treating Medscheme patients, (2) only surgeons treating 
Medscheme patients form part of the profiling process, and (3) the profiling 
process only determines the efficiency with which in-hospital services are utilised 
by surgeons in the treatment of their patients. A limitation of a DEA profiling 
113 
 
approach is that efficiency scores are heavily dependent on the data used. The 
consequence of this is that the approaches exhibit low levels of robustness to 
extensions of the process to include the additional relevant data on surgeons’ 
practices. Therefore, surgeons’ efficiency scores are vulnerable to significant 
change if more data were available. The efficiency scores of surgeons determined 
in this study thus cannot be interpreted as reflecting the surgeons overall technical 
and price efficiency. This is both regarding the full range of services the surgeons 
provide as well as relative to all the surgeons practicing within the private 
healthcare sector in South Africa.  
Further research is required to investigate the robustness of the DEA profiling 
approach followed in this study in reflecting its appropriateness to represent a 
more holistic view of surgeon performance. In addition, it would be interesting to 
analyse how the results of this study would change over time. This is one of the 
methods of illustrating the robustness of this type of DEA profiling approach. 
8.2.5 Using classic DEA model 
Finally, the profiling approach limited choice to classic DEA models. As 
discussed in Section 6.6, this is owing to the fact that it would be premature at this 
early stage of South African DEA profiling research to use more complicated 
DEA models.  
As stated in Section 5, however, a profiling approach based on these models 
assumes that inefficient surgeons will be able to reduce the amount of all their 
healthcare service costs proportionally in order to improve efficiency. In practice, 
surgeons may, however, not be able to proportionally reduce the cost of all 
healthcare services utilised by the same multiple.  
This possibility thus needs further investigation. If found to be the case then ‘non-
classic’ DEA models (such as additive and non-orientated models) need to be 
applied and the resulting surgeon profiles analysed. 
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8.3 Final comments 
This section illustrates that DEA provides numerous benefits for use by South 
African funders to profile the efficiency of surgeons providing in-hospital 
services. These benefits reflect both enhancements in the accuracy of efficiency 
estimates and improvements in facilitating the presentation of profiles to 
inefficient surgeons.  However, extensive further research is required in order to 
address some of the major potential limitations in the interpretation of the results.  
Development of the approach is, therefore, necessary before its extended use to 
profile all types of physicians. The body of international literature on DEA is, 
however, extensive providing the necessary material needed for these limitations 
to be addressed. As such, it can be concluded that DEA represents a significant 
opportunity for South African healthcare funders to achieve greater understanding 
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